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THE ROOTS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AT 
COMMON LAW: A LONGER HISTORY 
JASON TALIADOROS 
ABSTRACT 
This Article aims to revisit the historical development of the doctrine of 
exemplary or punitive damages. Punitive damages are anomalous in that they lie in 
both tort and crime, a matter that has led to much criticism by modern 
commentators. Yet, a definitive history of punitive damages does not exist to explain 
this anomaly. The main contribution of this Article, then, is to begin such a history 
by way of a meta-narrative. It identifies and links the historically significant 
moments that led to punitive damages, beginning with the background period of 
classical Roman law, its renewed reception in Western Europe in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries that coincided with the emergence of the English common law, 
the English statutes of the late thirteenth century, to the court cases of Wilkes v. 
Wood and Huckle v. Money in the eighteenth century that heralded the “first explicit 
articulation” of the legal principle of punitive damages. This Article argues that this 
history is not linear in nature but historically contingent. This is a corrective to 
present scholarship, which fails to adequately connect or contextualize these 
historical moments, or over-simplifies this development over time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Compensation is the dominant remedy, if not the purpose, of modern tort law, 
but fault still has a prominent place in many forms of wrongdoing. The concept of 
fault is deeply rooted in English law’s comingling of tort and crime. Thus, the 
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apparent anomaly of fault within the compensatory framework of modern tort law 
can be reconciled by tracing the roots of fault to the doctrines that support both tort 
and crime in English common law.1 
Punitive, or exemplary, damages are an exception to the most fundamental 
principle in the modern law of remedies that tort damages should restore the victim 
to the pre-tort condition (restitutio in integrum).2 I will use the terms punitive 
damages and exemplary damages interchangeably throughout this Article. Punitive 
damages are used as a supplementary sanction in exceptional cases where 
compensatory damages do not provide sufficient levels of deterrence and 
retribution.3 Known by various names, including penal, retributory, or vindictive 
damages, punitive damages are damages “over and above those necessary to 
compensate the plaintiff.”4 Punitive damages are awarded for three main reasons: (1) 
“to punish the defendant and provide retribution,” (2) “to act as a deterrent to the 
defendant and others minded to behave in a similar way,” and (3) “ to demonstrate 
the court’s disapproval of such conduct.”5 Punitive damages differ in purpose from 
“aggravated damages.” Punitive damages are awarded to punish the wrongdoer, 
whereas, aggravated damages “are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for increased 
mental suffering due to the manner in which the defendant behaved in committing 
the wrong or thereafter.”6 
Punitive damages are anomalous and frequently criticized because the rationales 
behind them lie in both tort and crime.7 A definitive history of punitive damages has 
not yet been written to explain this anomaly. This Article aims to revisit the main 
historical developments that are linked to the development of the doctrine of punitive 
damages. This Article will formulate a longer meta-narrative that rejects linearity 
and allows for historical contingency. This Article is a corrective to present 
scholarship, which fails to adequately connect the historical moments that link 
punitive damages to its roots in tort and crime.  
Current scholarship begins the story of punitive damages in the classical period 
of Roman law. From there, the story jumps to the newly emerging common law of 
                                                           
 1  See Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118, 149-50 (Austl.) 
(Windeyer J).  
 2  See, e.g., United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958); Livingstone v. 
Rawyards Coal Co. [1880] 5 App. Cas. 25 (HL) 39 (appeal taken from Scot.) (Lord 
Blackburn); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“[T]he 
law of torts attempts primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible 
equivalent to his position prior to the tort.”).  
 3  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (explaining that 
punitive damages as compared with compensatory damages “serve a broader function . . . 
aimed at deterrence and retribution.”). 
 4  Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd v Sahin [2011] VSC 505, [43] (Austl.) (quoting Carter v 
Walker [2010] VSCA 340, [284] (Austl.)). 
 5  HAROLD LUNTZ, ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH [1.7.1], 
71 (4th ed. 2002) (footnotes omitted). 
 6  Id.  
 7  ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (rev. ed. 2012); Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 86-87 (2003). 
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Western Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that revived Roman law and 
then to the English statutes of the later thirteenth century. Finally, current 
scholarship finishes the tale of punitive damages by citing the court cases of Wilkes 
v. Wood and Huckle v. Money in 1763 that led to the “first explicit articulation” of 
the legal principle of exemplary damages.8  
This Article reveals that there is no overarching doctrinal unity in the 
development of punitive damages, but rather a series of historical and doctrinal 
circumstances that intersected to give rise to concepts recognizable as pre-modern 
cognates of punitive damages. In discussing these issues, I can present only a few 
selected texts, rather than a complete narrative. I am aware that, in treating some 
topics, I only touch the surface of problems that would require a deeper and more 
detailed analysis of the source material to provide a full-scale treatment of them. 
Such treatment is unavoidable in pursuing a limited theme through a variety of 
sources over a period of several centuries, and further analysis remains a task for this 
author and others.  
This Article begins with an outline of the current dilemma that Anglo-American 
law perceives in the doctrine of punitive damages and how Anglo-American legal 
history reflects this dilemma. This Article then analyzes three significant historical 
moments. The first of these historical moments is the sensational litigation that 
erupted after the 1763 publication of The North Briton, No. 45. This Article 
examines the Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money cases heard before Lord Chief 
Justice Pratt to illustrate the tension between judicial attempts to control doctrinal 
development of the law of damages and the ostensibly uncontrolled role of juries in 
awarding damages without recourse to such legal considerations.  
This Article uses these eighteenth-century cases to suggest that the courts 
awarded exemplary damages based on the Roman law concept of iniuria, which is 
best translated as “affront to feelings” or “outrage.” The Article examines the 
doctrinal development of the concept of iniuria from its classical Roman law origins 
to its provenance in the Justinianic Roman law of the medieval West, and suggests 
its reception in the English common law in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  
The second historical moment of note that is often cited as a pre-modern 
analogue of exemplary damages is the late thirteenth-century English statutes that 
provided for “multiple” damages. This section of the Article suggests that the 
Roman law concept of iniuria played an influential role in late thirteenth-century 
statutory drafting and the adoption of “multiple” damages.  
The third historical moment often mentioned in the history of exemplary 
damages is the Anglo-Saxon “money compositions.” The Article suggests that the 
money compositions were part of a parallel narrative in which, by the end of the 
thirteenth century, the common law began to discern a qualitative significance 
between crime and tort.  
                                                           
 8  Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498; (1763) Lofft 1 (“[A] jury have it in 
their power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are designed not only 
as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment . . . .”); Huckle v. Money 
(1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769; 3 Wils. K.B. 205 (introducing the term “exemplary damages” 
to explain an award that exceeded actual damage). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Origins of the Punitive Damages Dilemma  
The leading modern decision in the Anglo-American law of punitive damages is 
the 1964 House of Lords’ decision, in particular the leading judgment of Lord 
Devlin, in Rookes v. Barnard.9 In a seminal account of the origins and history of the 
development of punitive damages, Lord Devlin, citing Street’s 1962 edition of 
Principles of the Law of Damages, stated that punitives “originated just 200 years 
ago in the cause célèbre of John Wilkes and The North Briton in which the legality 
of a general warrant was successfully challenged.”10 Lord Devlin’s reference was to 
the 1763 cases of Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money.  
Other common-law countries have also noted the origins of the concept of 
punitive damages in Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money. The United States 
Supreme Court cited Wilkes and two late eighteenth-century American cases for the 
proposition that punitive damages have been a traditional part of state law.11 The 
Australian High Court also acknowledged that Wilkes was the earliest authority to 
use the term exemplary damages,12 but doubted whether its origins lay there.13  
B. The Conflicting Policies Underlying the Punitive Damages Dilemma 
In addition to its discussion of the historical origins of exemplary damages, Lord 
Devlin and the House of Lords in Rookes reflected on the fundamental policy 
dilemma inherent in punitive damages doctrine. After reviewing the authorities for 
the case, Lord Devlin noted an anomaly: “when one examines the cases in which 
large damages have been awarded for conduct of this sort, it is not at all easy to say 
whether the idea of compensation or the idea of punishment has prevailed.”14  
Lord Devlin continued, adding, “there are certain categories of cases in which an 
award of exemplary damages can serve a useful purpose in vindicating the strength 
of the law and thus affording a practical justification for admitting into the civil law 
a principle which ought logically to belong to the criminal.”15 His Lordship then 
went on to define certain circumstances in which exemplary damages would be 
available to a defendant. These categories were threefold: (1) “oppressive, arbitrary 
                                                           
 9  Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 10  Id. at 1221-22 (Lord Devlin) (quoting HARRY STREET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
DAMAGES 28 (1962)). Elsewhere in that same textbook, the author referred to the role of the 
Roman law notion of iniuria in damages, which I discuss later in this part. 
 11  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (citing Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 
98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498; (1763) Lofft 1; Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 6 (1784); Coryell 
v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791)); id. at 25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing the nineteenth-
century text books published in the United States: THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES 35 (4th ed. 1868); and GEORGE W. FIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
DAMAGES 66 (1876)).  
 12  New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638, 648 (Austl.). 
 13  Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118, 152 (Austl.) (Windeyer J) 
(noting that its origins occurred before 1763). 
 14  Rookes [1964] AC at 1221 (Lord Devlin). 
 15  Id. at 1226.  
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or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government”; (2) where the 
“defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which 
may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff”; and (3) where 
“exemplary damages are expressly authorised by statute.”16  
Other common-law countries, however, have not taken such a confined and 
categorical approach to awarding exemplary damages. In the United States, 
exemplary damages are a well-settled principle of common law,17 but their 
application differs from state to state, as exemplary damages are generally a matter 
of state law. In many states, punitive damages are determined based on statute. 
Whereas in other states, punitive damages may be determined based solely on case 
law.18  
In Australia, the High Court rejected the notion that awards of exemplary 
damages could only occur if one of the three categories in Rookes were satisfied. In 
actions for tort, according to the High Court, exemplary damages may be awarded 
for any conduct of a sufficiently reprehensible kind, whether it fell within the three 
categories or not.19 The principles were summarized in this way:  
It seems from the award of damages that the jury took the view that 
the publication of the libel in the first edition and again in the second was 
in each case wanton conduct and had the colour of a contumelious 
disregard of [the plaintiff’s] reputation both as a man and a member of 
Parliament. The jury could only express their disapproval or “detestation” 
(a word used by Pratt C.J. in Wilkes v. Wood) by awarding exemplary 
damages. That is the purpose of exemplary damages. I think taking all the 
circumstances of the case into consideration and the summing up, that the 
jury were moved to punish the defendant in that way.20 
The High Court downplayed the restrictive nature of Lord Devlin’s tripartite 
categorization of exemplary damages, writing that “his Lordship was not purporting 
to state any new principle. Nor was he stating one the application of which depended 
upon the official position of the defendant; the principle was stated in general terms 
as one which had application to a tortious act committed by any person.”21 In the 
High Court’s view, the law relating to exemplary damages both in England and in 
Australia was that exemplary damages might be awarded “if it appeared that, in the 
                                                           
 16  Id. at 1226-27. 
 17  See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see 
also Ronen Perry, Economic Loss, Punitive Damages, and the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 45 GA 
L. REV. 409, 440-41 (2011). 
 18  See Perry, supra note 17, at 441-43. 
 19  Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118, 138 (Taylor J) (Austl.). The 
United Kingdom Privy Council (as it was then the ultimate court of appeal) confirmed the 
correctness of the High Court of Australia’s approach in this case under Australian law. 
Australian Consol Press Ltd v Uren (1967) 117 CLR 221 (PC) 241 (appeal taken from Austl.) 
(Eng.). The Australian High Court was of the view that there was a reasonably clear concept 
of exemplary damages in Australian law prior to Rookes, as set out in the previous Australian 
High Court case of Whitfield v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71, 77 (Knox CJ) (Austl.). 
 20  Uren (1966) 117 CLR at 127 (McTiernan J) (Austl.). 
 21  Id. at 133 (Taylor J). 
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commission of the wrong complained of, the conduct of the defendant had been 
high-handed, insolent, vindictive or malicious or had in some other way exhibited a 
contumelious disregard of the plaintiff's rights.”22 The decision in Rookes, despite its 
trenchant criticism by the Australian High Court,23 as well as other jurisdictions, was 
subsequently upheld by a 4-3 majority of the House of Lords and thus remains the 
law of England today.24 
C. The Difference Between Aggravated and Punitive Damages 
One further aspect of note in Lord Devlin’s seminal judgment in Rookes was its 
attempt to distinguish punitive damages from aggravated damages. Lord Devlin 
stated that the numerous epithets for punitive damages—“willful, wanton, high-
handed, oppressive, malicious, outrageous”—were merely descriptive of the 
circumstances of the case and were insufficient justification for punitive damages,25 
he explained that punitive damages must be distinguished from the category of 
aggravated damages, “in which injury to the plaintiff has been aggravated by malice 
or by the manner of doing the injury, that is, the insolence or arrogance by which it is 
accompanied.”26 While exemplary damages had a punitive element, aggravated 
damages, in contrast, compensated the defendant for the aggravated nature of the 
defendant’s conduct. Lord Devlin then declared: “This conclusion will, I hope, 
remove from the law a source of confusion between aggravated and exemplary 
damages which has troubled the learned commentators on the subject.”27 
Thus, in the context of the Anglo-American law of punitive damages, the 
decision in Rookes is significant in highlighting three matters of ongoing contention 
and debate regarding punitive damages: (1) their origins in English legal history; (2) 
the uncertainty of whether their philosophical or jurisprudential foundations lie in 
criminal law or tort law and; (3) their conceptual differentiation and distinction from 
aggravated damages. The purpose of this Article is to shed light on these issues by a 
historical examination of the roots of punitive damages. 
II. PUNITIVE OR COMPENSATORY? PUNITIVE DAMAGES ON TRIAL 
A. The North Briton, No. 45 Cases and The Role of Juries and Judges in Eighteenth-
Century Damages Awards 
The two seminal cases of Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money are the first 
explicit articulation of the doctrine of punitive damages. Lord Chief Justice Pratt 
decided these cases on the legality of a series of arrests under general warrant 
following the publication of the politically provocative pamphlet The North Briton, 
No. 45 that was critical of King George III and his ministers. The following sections 
                                                           
 22  Id. at 129; see also id. at 138 (“Exemplary damages are given only in cases of 
conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another’s rights.”) (quoting Whitfield v 
De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71, 77 (Knox CJ)). 
 23  See id. at 138-39; see also Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1, 7-8 (Austl.). 
 24  Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd. [1972] AC 1027 (HL) 1029 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 25  Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129 (HL) 1229 (Lord Devlin) (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
 26  Id. 
 27  Id. at 1230 (Lord Devlin). 
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examine these cases and the principles expressed in them concerning punitive 
damages.  
The following sections further examine the importance, during the late eighteenth 
century, of the respective roles of the jury, the judiciary, and practitioners in the 
determination of damages awards that might be excessive. Any narrative of doctrinal 
development must take into account the contingencies that unpredictable jury awards 
might represent. I conclude this section, however, by observing the beginning of a 
systematic approach to legal learning in the eighteenth century that paralleled this 
apparently unimpeded jury power.  
1. The North Briton, No. 45 Cases: Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money 
In Wilkes v. Wood, Mr. Wilkes’s house was the subject of a search under a 
general warrant of arrest, and he brought an action in trespass against the official 
who executed the search.28 His counsel asked for “large and exemplary damages,” 
since trivial damages would not put a stop to such proceedings.29 Lord Chief Justice 
Pratt instructed the jury that “[d]amages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the 
injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such 
proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action 
itself.”30 Lord Devlin categorized this and another case under the first category of 
oppressive conduct by servants of the government. The other case was Huckle v. 
Money. 
In Huckle, government messengers arrested and confined the printer of The 
North Briton pamphlet for six hours on the orders of the Secretary of State.31 
Although treated well, Huckle brought a suit alleging trespass, assault, and false 
imprisonment against the official executing the warrant.32 The jury awarded a verdict 
in favour of Huckle for £300 in damages.33 Lord Chief Justice Pratt, the presiding 
judge, refused the application to set aside the jury verdict as excessive.34 Despite the 
fact that actual damages amounted to £20 at most, His Lordship stated: 
[I] think they [the court] have done right in giving exemplary damages. 
To enter a man’s home by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to 
procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under 
which no Englishman would wish to live an hour; it was a most daring 
public attack upon the liberty of the subject.35 
Further, Pratt stated: 
                                                           
 28  Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 489; (1763) Lofft 1 (Lord Pratt CJ). 
 29  Id. at 490. 
 30  Id. at 498-99. 
 31  Huckle v. Money (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768; 3 Wils. K.B. 205. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Id. at 769. 
 35  Id.  
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[P]erhaps £20 damages would have been thought damages sufficient; but 
the small injury done to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness of his 
station and rank in life did not appear to the jury in that striking light in 
which the great points of law touching the liberty of the subject appeared 
to them at the trial; they saw a magistrate all over the King’s subjects, 
exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta, and attempting to 
destroy the liberty of the kingdom . . . .36 
Wilkes and Huckle are cited as the paradigmatic exemplars of circumstances 
when punitive damages might be awarded.37 Yet histories of punitive damages rarely 
venture beyond these two cases. Nor do these cases explain that the precedents 
discussed by Pratt LCJ in Wilkes and Huckle, and other cases of the time, occurred in 
a context when juries had near-total control over damages awards. 
2. The Role of Juries and Judges in Determining Damages Awards 
It is important to understand the nature of jury verdicts awarding damages in the 
context of the common law in the late eighteenth century. At this time, juries had 
virtually carte blanche in awarding damages.38 From its classical form, the jury was a 
group of twelve local people who knew the facts of the case and came to a 
veredictum (lit. “truth-telling,” or verdict).39 There were, however, some checks and 
balances put in place by the court to control the damages awards granted by juries.  
The writ of attaint was the primary form of controlling a jury prior to the 
eighteenth century.40 By 1202, the jury of attaint was a well-established procedure; it 
was comprised of twenty-four knights who were summoned to form a grand jury to 
review the verdict of a petty jury and to assess, on a re-trying of the evidence, 
whether the original verdict was or was not “unjust.”41 The aim of this writ was to 
prevent criminal abuse of the process of justice, specifically perjury by jurors. The 
punishment for a false verdict was capital punishment.42  
The application of attaint was originally confined to verdicts of assizes only. 
Attaint expanded to all trespass actions in the thirteenth century, to land disputes in 
the late thirteenth century, and to all pleas after 1360.43 The first use of attaint solely 
                                                           
 36  Id. at 768-69. 
 37  See Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL) 1221-23 (appeal taken from Eng.). Lord 
Devlin also cited a third case, Benson v. Frederick (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1130; 3 Burr. 1845, in 
which a soldier obtained damages of 150 pounds against his colonel who had ordered him to 
be flogged “so as to vex a fellow officer.” Rookes [1964] AC at 1222-23. Lord Mansfield 
acknowledged that the quantum of damages was beyond the actual harm suffered, but 
nevertheless upheld the sum. See Benson, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. at 1130. 
 38  See JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-
AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 66 (2006).  
 39  Ralph V. Turner, The Origins of the Medieval English Jury: Frankish, English, or 
Scandinavian? 7 J. BRIT. ST. no. 2, May 1968, at 3-4.  
 40  George T. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law (pt. 1), 47 L.Q. REV. 
345, 346 (1931). 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. at 347. 
 43  Id. 
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on the basis of the erroneous assessment of damages was in the early thirteenth 
century, in the forms of the “certifications” required of juries. That use, however, did 
not persist beyond the fourteenth century.44 Later in the thirteenth century, the first 
Statute of Westminster of 1275 permitted, as a matter of “grace,” a means of 
reducing awards of damages if the amount was “outrageous” to the grand jurors and 
the plaintiff was out of pocket as a result.45  
The doctrine of attaint expanded in the fifteenth century. The court nisi prius (at 
first instance) could question the jury and make a recommendation on the record of 
matters within the court’s “certain knowledge” (conusans) that would lead to the full 
court in banc at Westminster increasing the award.46 Only cases, such as battery or 
mayhem (not so trespass to land and goods), could be matters of conusans, since the 
court could review the evidence with its own eyes before entering judgment.47 By 
the sixteenth century, the procedure of attaint was obsolete, and was formally 
abolished in 1825.48  
However, scholars have pointed out that juries were not entirely omnipotent. For 
example, Richard Helmholz qualifies the notion that juries had a virtual carte 
blanche in damages awards up to the eighteenth century.49 He argues that in slander 
cases during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the judge’s 
instructions to the jury and lawyers’ submissions to the jury as to the factors to be 
taken into account in awarding damages played a significant role in the jury award.50 
Furthermore, George T. Washington observes instances of judicial control over 
awards in a number of non-slander instances before the mid-seventeenth century, 
such as cases of debt, novel disseisin, detinue, and replevin.51  
Helmholz notes, too, that by the sixteenth century, a motion “in arrest of 
judgment” in a slander case provided a means for decreasing (remittitur) or, 
possibly, increasing (addititur) the damages award of a jury.52 The procedure of 
remittitur involved the plaintiff voluntarily forgiving the excessive component of the 
damages award. In practice, the initiative to forgive excessive damages came by 
means of persuasion from the judge refusing to enter judgment until such a 
concession was made.53 This practice survived until 1622.54  
                                                           
 44  Id. at 348. 
 45  Id. at 347, 349. 
 46  Id. at 354-55. 
 47  Id. at 355, 357. 
 48  See The Juries Act 1825, 6 Geo. 4 c. 50, § 60. 
 49  But see OLDHAM, supra note 38, at 66.  
 50  R. H. Helmholz, Damages in Actions for Slander at Common Law, 103 L.Q. Rev. 624, 
624-29 (1987) [hereinafter Helmholz, Slander at Common Law]. 
 51  Washington, supra note 40, at 351-53. 
 52  Helmholz, Slander at Common Law, supra note 50, at 629-35. See also J. H. BAKER, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 72-74 (2d ed. 1979), on the three forms of 
motion for reviewing jury verdicts that existed by the sixteenth century, namely in arrest of 
judgment, non obstante veredicto, and a new trial. 
 53  Helmholz, Slander at Common Law, supra note 50, at 630. 
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3. The Shift in Power from Jury to Judge Under the Motion for New Trial 
By far the most significant moment in shifting the balance of power from jury to 
judge was the availability of the motion to order a new trial, which developed by the 
late 1700s. As early as the 1590s, common-law courts granted new trials in 
circumstances where juries violated procedural rules set up to control their “official 
deportment.”55 But the procedure only fully took root in the second half of the 
seventeenth century, no doubt a reaction by the common-law courts to the like 
recourse that litigants had in the courts of equity.  
The seminal decision was the 1655 decision of Wood v. Gunston, an “action of 
trespass for words.”56 In this case, the defendant called the plaintiff a “traytor” and 
the jury awarded £1,500 pounds in damages.57 The defendant’s counsel sought a new 
trial on the basis that “it was a packed business else there could not have been such 
great damages.”58 There is a difference of opinion on the significance of this case, 
however. Some commentators note that this case marked the point at which a new 
trial was granted “on the merits, as distinguished from the old practice of setting 
aside a verdict for certain types of misconduct by the jury.”59 But near-contemporary 
Pratt LCJ believed that this was on the basis of jury misconduct because there was 
tampering with the jury (“a packed business”).60  
Nevertheless, in the late 1600s and early 1700s, a more liberal attitude to 
granting new trials prevailed. In 1726, there is an instance that signals a 
determination of such matters “on discretion” in the case of Chambers v. Robinson.61  
While the King’s Bench used its discretion to grant new trials in instances of 
excessive jury verdicts on damages, the Court of Common Pleas adopted instead the 
“rule of certainty,” which provided that it would only interfere with the decision at 
first instance if there was certain evidence of error.62 Washington characterizes the 
cases of the 1760s, such as Huckle and Beardmore v. Carrington, as instances of the 
                                                           
 54  Hawkins v. Sciet (1622) 81 Eng. Rep. 1099; (1622) Palmer 314 (in which the court 
declined to set aside a verdict of £150 for slander, resolving to “leave such matters of fact to 
be found by the jury, who better understand [conusont] the quality and estate of the parties, 
and the damages sustained”). 
 55  Washington, supra note 40, at 358.  
 56  Wood v. Gunston (1655) 82 Eng. Rep. 863, 867; (1655) Style 462. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Washington, supra note 40, at 362; see also William Renwick Riddell, New Trial at 
Common Law, 26 YALE L.J. 49, 55 n.13 (1916). 
 60  Beardmore v. Carrington (1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 792; 2 Wils. K.B. 244 (Lord Pratt 
CJ). Although the printed report by Wilson gives only a per curiam opinion, the first textbook 
on damages by Joseph Sayer, written six years later, indicates that it was Pratt LCJ who spoke 
for the court. See OLDHAM, supra note 38, at 66 (citing JOSEPH SAYER, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 
222-227 (2d ed. 1792) (1770)). 
 61  Chambers v. Robinson (1726) 93 Eng. Rep. 787; 2 Strange 693 (Holt J) (granting a 
new trial, stating, “it was but reasonable he [the defendant] should try another jury, before he 
was finally charged”); see also Washington, supra note 40, at 363.  
 62  Washington, supra note 40, at 363. 
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rule of certainty: “only in cases where the damages were certain as a matter of law 
would a new trial be granted if the jury made an erroneous assessment.”63 In these 
cases, the assessment was not a matter of law, but one for the jurors as 
“constitutional judges” of the amount of recovery.64 By the end of the eighteenth 
century, the position was that the Court of Common Pleas would not grant a new 
trial in tort unless the amount given was so “monstrous and enormous” that all 
mankind would blush.65 In contrast, the King’s Bench stated that it would exercise 
its discretion in each case.66 The question of quantum of damages had by this time 
become reviewable as a matter of law, and not just a question of fact for the jury. 
But, if it was only in the eighteenth century that jury awards became subject to 
“review” by the motion of seeking a new trial as a matter of law, was there any point 
going back in time before this to investigate awards of exemplary or punitive 
damages? As Mark Lunney states: “It is only in the eighteenth century that points 
can be reserved from trial at nisi prius to be taken back to the court in banc [full 
court, sitting at Westminster] and it is no surprise that most of the substantive law 
begins from that period.”67 The answer, then, is an emphatic “yes.” 
The reason to delve further into history is that the common-law courts in the 
1760s, when looking to interpret the law on means of controlling damages verdicts 
by juries, looked backwards in time rather than seeing themselves as at the beginning 
of a new phase in this development (i.e., adopting the test of certainty). Evidence of 
this lies in the first textbook on damages published by Sayer in 1770, who, despite 
living through the changes that were taking place, had no presentiment of their 
significance by privileging and citing authorities that focused on the “older law.”68  
B. Possible Route of Doctrinal Development of Punitive Damages in Eighteenth-
Century English Common Law  
Sayer’s textbook is worth investigating further for its development of doctrine on 
exemplary damages, even though it is not the only example of regard to developed 
precedent. Sayer’s textbook, The Law of Damages, published in 1770, was the first 
                                                           
 63  Id. at 363. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Beardmore, 95 Eng. Rep. at 793. But in applying this principle to the facts of the case, 
Pratt LCJ stated:  
[C]an we say that that 1000l. [pounds] are monstrous damages as against him, who 
has granted an illegal warrant to a messenger who enters into a man’s house, and prys 
into all his secret and private affairs, and carries him from his house and business, and 
imprisons him for six days. It is an unlawful power assumed by a great minister of 
State. Can any body state that a guinea per diem is sufficient damages in this 
extraordinary case, which concerns the liberty of every one of the King’s subjects? 
We cannot say the damages of 1000l. are enormous; and therefore the rule to shew 
cause why a new trial should not be granted must be discharged. 
Id. at 793-94. 
 66  Washington, supra note 40, at 364. 
 67  Private communication with the author, and on file. 
 68  George T. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law (pt. 2), 48 L.Q. REV. 90, 
93 (1932). 
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such text on damages.69 Sayer’s analysis mirrors that of Pratt LCJ’s judgment in 
Beardmore, where a new trial was granted in cases where excessive damages were 
awarded.70 Like Pratt LCJ, Sayer refers to Ash v. Ash71 and Chambers v. Robinson.72  
In Ash, a new trial was permitted where a jury awarded the plaintiff £2,000 on a 
count of false imprisonment by her mother for two or three hours.73 Holt CJ stated 
that the jury’s power in awarding a verdict was not “absolute,” but was to come to its 
finding with the assistance of the judge and “to give their reason for finding the 
verdict as it is intended to be found, that if they proceeded upon a wrong notion they 
may be set right.”74 In Chambers, Sayer reports that a new trial was granted after a 
jury award of £1,000 for malicious prosecution was granted because the damages 
were excessive, and that it was “fit that the defendant should try another jury” before 
such an amount was imposed on the defendant.75 Unlike Sayer, Pratt LCJ rejected 
both of these cases as representing sound rationales for overturning jury awards of 
damages.76  
Another line of inquiry is suggestive in providing a link between Pratt LCJ’s 
awarding of punitive damages in the late eighteenth-century and the doctrinal 
thinking that preceded it. This thinking is centered on the concept of awarding 
“multiple damages” by statute. In his judgment in Beardmore, Pratt LCJ discloses 
that he had recourse to medieval statutes and Year Books in discussing the law on 
new trials being granted in cases of excessive verdicts in torts.77 Pratt LCJ indicates 
that his search for authorities included the Year Books of the mid 1300s and 1400s, 
in which courts did not grant new trials, but instead decreased or increased the 
                                                           
 69  JOSEPH SAYER, THE LAW OF DAMAGES (2d ed. 1792) (1770). Although a textbook is not 
necessarily conclusive evidence of legal doctrine and practice in its contemporaneous context, 
it nevertheless provides contemporary evidence of directions in legal thought. More so, it is 
difficult to ignore in the absence of other contrary contemporaneous evidence.  
 70  Beardmore, 95 Eng. Rep. at 793. 
 71  (1701) 90 Eng. Rep. 526; (1701) Comberbach 357. 
 72  (1726) 93 Eng. Rep. 787; 2 Strange 691; see also SAYER, supra note 69, at 215-16.  
 73  Ash, 90 Eng. Rep. at 526. 
 74  SAYER, supra note 69, at 216.  
 75  Id. 
 76  Pratt LCJ read Wood v. Gunston not as demonstrating the authority of a court to order a 
new trial in the case of excessive damages but instead showing that this could be done in 
instances only of jury misbehavior. The overturning of the jury award in the case of Ash v. 
Ash, according to Pratt LCJ, was “plainly for the misdemeanor of the jury in refusing to 
answer the Judge when he asked what ground or reason they went upon.” Beardmore v. 
Carrington (1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 792; 2 Wils. K.B. 244. In the case of Chambers v. 
Robinson, Pratt LCJ said it was the “only case where ever a new trial was granted merely for 
the excessiveness of damages only,” but disagreed with the rationale of that decision, namely 
that of giving the defendant “a chance of another jury . . . and would be a reason for a third 
and fourth trial, and would be digging up by the constitution by the roots; and therefore we are 
free to say that this case is not law.” Id. at 792. 
 77  Id. 
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damages award themselves “upon view of plaintiff’s mayhem78 and identifying his 
person,” that is, after viewing the wronged plaintiff and seeing the impact of the 
tort.79  
Pratt LCJ was not alone in this recourse to medieval authorities, particularly 
statute books. The text book writer, Sayer, delved back as far as the 1400s in a 
chapter entitled “Of Double and Treble Damages,” where, against the general rule 
that “single damages [only were] recoverable,” he observed that double, or treble, 
damages were given “by particular statutes.”80 These included statues from: 1689, 
which provided for multiple damages in cases of breach of the process of distraint;81 
1429 in cases of forcible entry;82 and 1601 for an action in trespass against an 
overseer of the poor brought in 1755.83  
                                                           
 78  The offense of mayhem at the time of Bracton was defined as an aggravated act that 
incapacitated a man from fighting. See Graham McBain, Modernising the Common Law 
Offences of Assault and Battery, 4 INT’L L. RES. 1, 53 (2015), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ilr.v4n1p39. 
 79  Pratt LCJ referred to cases from 1348 on battery; 1401 and 1405 on conspiracy; 1407, 
where damages were not increased despite the Justice of Nisi Prius considering them too low 
without “seeing the mayhem”; 1430 on debt, in which the court increased the damages 
amount. His Lordship concluded: 
From these ancient cases it was argued, that Courts of Justice have in all times 
considered themselves authorized to review the damages given by juries in all kinds of 
actions, and either to abridge or increase them; and since that practice has been 
disused, and abridging damages by the Court has been looked upon as 
unconstitutional, new trials have been granted for excessive damages. 
Beardmore, 95 Eng. Rep. at 792. 
 80  SAYER, supra note 69, at 242-43. 
 81  Id. at 243-45; see also 2 W. & M. c. 5, in 6 STATUTES OF THE REALM 169-70 (reprt. ed. 
1963). Chapter 5 enables the sale of goods that have been distrained for rent where the rent 
has not been paid on time, providing five days elapse from the time notice is given. Id. 
Paragraph 3, however, allows the person whose goods are distrained for the rent to recover 
“their Treble Damages and Costs of Suite against the Offender” in any “Rescous or Pound-
Breach.” Id. Further, section 4 provides that the person whose goods are distrained may 
“recover double the value of the goods” in an action of trespass on the case “where in truth 
noe Rent is arreare or due.” Id. 
 82  8 Hen. 6 c. 9, in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 246 (reprt. ed. 1963). Chapter 9 provides a 
recital of 15 Rich. 2 c. 2 against forcible entry and permitting the assize of novel disseisin, 
including the provision that a plaintiff successful in recovering their land under the assize of 
novel disseisin “shall recover his Treble Damages against the Defendant” in cases where the 
defendant “entered with Force into the Lands and Tenements, or them after his Entry did hold 
with Force.” 8 Hen. 6 c. 9. 
 83  43 Eliz. 1 c. 2, § 18, in 4(2) STATUTES OF THE REALM 965 (reprt. ed. 1963). Chapter 2, 
section 18 provides that a plaintiff who brings an action of trespass against a defendant who 
purports to distrain or sell the plaintiff’s property for the purposes of this statute shall proceed 
in the normal way to trial by jury, requiring the defendant to avow their justification for the 
use of the property. In the event that the defendant is successful, “the same Defendant to 
recover Treble Damages, by reason of his wrongfull vexacion in that behalfe, with his Costs 
also in that same parte susteyned, and also that to be assessed by the same Jurie or Writ to 
inquire of the Damages, as the same shall require.” Id.  
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In addition to Sayer’s list, there were other statutes giving rise to multiple 
damages, and which judges, lawyers, and legal writers of the eighteenth century may 
have known. Section 5 of the Habeas Corpus Act (1679) provided that an officer’s 
failure to deliver the charged person within the required time meant “for the first 
offence forfeit to the prisoner or party grieved the sum of one hundred pounds; and 
for the second offence the sum of two hundred pounds.”84 The Statute of Monopolies 
(1624), moved by Sir Edward Coke, provided for the limiting of Crown-granted 
monopolies under pain of triple damages to those aggrieved by seizure of their goods 
or chattels “by occasion or pretexts of any Monopolies.”85 These laws indicate that 
the notion of multiple damages was known to common lawyers of the eighteenth 
century in the form of statutes from as early as the 1270s and 1420s that still 
operated to exact double or treble damages for certain forms of wrongdoing. 
C. Distinguishing Exemplary from Aggravated Damages in Eighteenth-Century 
English Common Law  
One conceptual difficulty that emerges in examining these cases from the 1760s 
is the lack of a clear differentiation between excessive awards on the basis of 
punitive damages and those based on aggravated damages. Especially in cases of 
slander, as the courts have noted in modern times, there is likely to be considerable 
overlap between aggravated damages and punitive damages. This was so in the 
context of the cases in the 1760s.  
Alongside the cases just discussed concerning publication of The North Briton, 
No. 45, there were other cases in which juries awarded large verdicts for mental 
suffering, wounded dignity, and injured feelings—in other words, for aggravated 
damages. These circumstances also include seduction, as in the 1769 case of 
Tullidge v. Wade, involving the action for loss of a daughter’s services, and, as noted 
by Justice Bathurst, “the circumstances of time and place, when and where the insult 
is given, require different damages; as it is a greater insult to be beaten upon the 
Royal Exchange, than in a private room.”86 Paul Mitchell cites Tullidge as an 
example of eighteenth-century courts taking inspiration from the Roman law concept 
of iniuria to award exemplary damages, as discussed further below.87  
Paul Mitchell’s historical analysis examines factors that could increase damage 
awards apart from special damage. He begins with the general principle stated by 
Pratt LCJ in Huckle that the “state, degree, quality, trade or profession of the party 
injured, as well of the person who did the injury, must be, and generally are, 
considered by the jury in giving damages.”88 Malice could evince an improper 
motive that made it worse. In explaining the relevance of malice to damages in 
nineteenth-century case law, Mitchell posits  
                                                           
 84  31 Car. 2 c. 2, § 5, in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 936 (reprt. ed. 1963); see also 31 Car. 
2 c. 1, § 16, in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 929 (reprt. ed. 1963) (referring to payment of 
“Treble Damages” by a party offending the Act); 31 Car. 2 c. 1, § 31, in 5 STATUTES OF THE 
REALM 934 (reprt. ed. 1963) (referring to defendants being able to “recover their treble Costs” 
if a suit against him or her does not succeed). 
 85  21 Jac. 1 c. 3, § 4, in 4(2) STATUTES OF THE REALM 1212 (reprt. ed. 1963). 
 86  Tullidge v. Wade (1769) 95 Eng. Rep. 909; 3 Wils. K.B. 18. 
 87  PAUL MITCHELL, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN LAW OF DEFAMATION 66-67 (2005). 
 88  Id. at 64 (quoting Huckle v. Money (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768; 2 Wils. K.B. 205). 
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an approach to compensation different to the one we are familiar with 
today . . . . [This approach] awarded damages for loss and to mark the fact 
that the claimant had suffered a wrong. “Injury” . . . was not a synonym 
for loss. It was both the wrong and its consequences.89  
Mitchell identified a trend towards awarding damages taking into account both 
the actual loss and the method of inflicting the damage, including malice. He cites 
two cases by way of example.  
In the first case, Sears v. Lyons, in 1818, the defendant deliberately scattered 
poisoned barley on the plaintiff’s land in order to kill his poultry.90 The judge 
directed the jury to consider the motive in awarding something beyond mere 
pecuniary damages.91 The second case, from 1814, Merest v. Harvey, involved a 
drunk and wealthy defendant who threatened the plaintiff with legal action through 
his office as a magistrate if he refused him the right to shoot on the plaintiff’s land.92 
The plaintiff received an enormous award of damages (500 pounds), and the Court 
of King’s Bench refused to set it aside as excessive.93 Was this to compensate for 
injured feelings (aggravated damages) or to make an example of the defendant’s 
poor conduct (exemplary damages)? Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Heath in Merest 
suggested that such an award “goes to prevent the practice of dueling, if juries are 
permitted to punish by exemplary damages,” thus indicating the latter.94  
The notion of malice is a factor that might increase damages beyond the actual 
harm suffered. But is it to be considered as part of the circumstances relevant to 
aggravated damages, namely those damages payable because of the aggravated 
nature of the circumstances in which the wrongdoer carries out the wrongdoing? Or, 
is malice part of the contempt shown to the victim and therefore part of exemplary 
damages? In 1770, the Court of Common Pleas in Bruce v. Rawlins reflected this 
uncertainty.95 In that case, customs officers entered the plaintiff’s house to search for 
goods on which they suspected no customs dues had been paid.96 Despite a search, 
the officers found none.97 The jury awarded plaintiff £100 in damages, which the 
court refused to interfere with on a writ of inquiry.98  
The three judges differed on their grounds for refusing the writ. Chief Justice 
Wilmot focused on the conduct of the customs officers and the injury to the 
plaintiff’s reputation.99 This line of reasoning follows the Huckle and Wilkes 
                                                           
 89  Id. at 65. 
 90  Sears v. Lyons (1818) 171 Eng. Rep. 658; 2 Stark 317. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Merest v. Harvey (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761; 5 Taunt 442. 
 93  Id. at 761. 
 94  Id. at 761 (Gibbs CJ & Heath J). 
 95  Bruce v. Rawlins (1770) 95 Eng. Rep. 934; 3 Wils. K.B. 61. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. at 934-35. 
 99  Id. at 934 (Wilmot CJ). 
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decisions, implying that exemplary, not aggravated, damages are relevant in Bruce. 
Justice Yates is more explicit in articulating exemplary damages as the basis of the 
jury award, following the reasoning in Beardmore that the “case must be very gross, 
and the damages enormous” for the award to be disturbed.100 Justice Gould, on the 
other hand, specifically notes that the defendant’s conduct in “entering the plaintiff’s 
house under colour of legal authority, aggravates the trespass.”101 It is pertinent to 
note, that these early cases demonstrate some slipperiness in clearly identifying 
earlier lineages of concepts of exemplary damages and must be treated with caution. 
D. Iniuria and Punitive Damages  
The slippery distinction between exemplary damages and aggravated damages in 
these early cases prior to their explicit differentiation in Rookes, nevertheless reflects 
the existence of an underlying notion to award damages beyond mere compensatory 
purposes and to award damages, additionally, for some further hurt to the victim by 
the very nature of the wrongdoer’s conduct. Pre-modern cognates to this intuited, yet 
difficult to articulate concept, lie in the Roman law notion of iniuria.  
In its essence, iniuria is the antonym of ius (law or right). That is to say, it 
denotes simply unlawfulness or the absence of a right.102 As the name of a particular 
delict in Roman law, this may be rendered in English by the word “insult” or 
“outrage,” although the full width of the Roman idea included “any contumelious 
disregard of another’s rights of personality.”103 It thus included not merely physical 
assaults and oral or written assaults and abuse, but any affront to another’s dignity or 
reputation and any disregard of another’s public or private rights, provided always 
that the act was done wilfully and with contumelious intent.104 The applicable 
penalty for the delict of iniuria, therefore, reflected the nature of the delict itself in 
not simply awarding compensation for actual harm suffered, but for the additional 
contumely suffered. 
Paul Mitchell has noted the provenance of the concept of iniuria in common-law 
cases of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as discussed above.105 He notes 
factors that could be “taken into account to increase damages” in Huckle, and 
demonstrations of this in the nineteenth-century cases Sears and Merest.106 Mitchell 
expands further on the notion of iniuria, when he notes that in Merest the presiding 
judge cited an example of how, if the recovery for trespass were limited to pecuniary 
damage, a man might repeatedly commit a trespass in a most invasive and offensive 
manner, but only give the claimant a halfpenny damages to settle his legal 
liability.107 This example, Mitchell observes, is “suspiciously similar” to a problem 
discussed in the Roman texts of a man, knowing that damages for iniuria were fixed, 
                                                           
 100  Id. at 935 (Yates J). 
 101  Id. (Gould J). 
 102  BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 216 (reprt. 1982). 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. at 215-16. 
 105  MITCHELL, supra note 87, at 65-67.  
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. at 66. 
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going around slapping people’s faces and then instructing his slave to hand over the 
fixed payment.108  
A second example examined by Mitchell is the earlier 1769 case of Tullidge, 
involving the action for loss of a daughter’s services.109 Bathurst J noted that “the 
circumstances of time and place, when and where the insult is given, require 
different damages; as it is a greater insult to be beaten upon the Royal Exchange, 
than in a private room.”110 This is compared with Justinian’s Institutes 4.4.9, in 
which one of the factors said to make an affront more serious is “the place where it is 
committed, e.g., whether the affront were perpetrated in the theatre or in the market 
place.”111 Mitchell dismisses the call for the common law to follow the Roman law 
of iniuria on such matters,112 claiming that the common law already heeded the call 
in the eighteenth century, as demonstrated in the cases just discussed.113 In this 
regard, he notes that the High Court of Australia has borrowed the vocabulary from 
Roman law roots of punitive damages, approving the test that there must be a case of 
“conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another’s rights.”114 The 
following section attempts provide what Mitchell does not: A historical lineage by 
which the concept of iniuria was received into the English common law.  
1. Origins of the Notion of Iniuria  
In classical Roman law, iniuria in general meant simply omne quod non iure fit 
(“everything that is not lawful”).115 As a special delict, however, it meant 
contumelia, insult or outrage.116 Based on outraged feelings rather than on economic 
loss, the actio iniuriarum was, as Buckland noted, vindictam spirans.117 The money 
                                                           
 108  Id.; see also JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, 
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 217 (2006)  (clarifying that this story dates from the third 
century and was recorded in AULUS GELLIUS, NOCTES ATTICAE 20.1 (Albert Lion ed. 1825)). 
 109  Tullidge v. Wade (1769) 95 Eng. Rep. 909; 3 Wils. K.B. 18. 
 110  Id. at 910 (Bathurst J). 
 111  MITCHELL, supra note 87, at 67; cf. G. INST. 3.220 (F. de Zulueta trans., 1946). 
 112  See Peter Birks, Harassment and Hubris: The Right to an Equality of Respect, 32 IRISH 
JURIST 1, 10 (1997). 
 113  MITCHELL, supra note 87, at 67. 
 114  Id. (quoting Whitfield v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71, 77 (Knox CJ) (Austl.)). 
Mitchell suggests that the phrase “contumelious” was taken from a passage in Salmond’s 1920 
edition of his textbook on torts, where he discussed the Roman approach to compensation for 
insult, in which the Latin term contumelia (“contempt”) was used to describe the kind of 
conduct that was actionable. Id. (discussing JOHN W. SALMOND, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 129 (5th ed. 1920)). But Knox CJ in his judgment makes no mention of this textbook. 
See Whitfield, 29 CLR at 77 (Knox CJ). 
 115  John S. Beckerman, Adding Insult to Iniuria: Affronts to Honor and the Origins of 
Trespass, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SAMUEL E. 
THORNE 159, 176-77 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., 1981); see also J. INST. 4.4.7 (Peter Birks & 
Grant McLeod trans., 1987). 
 116  W. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 584 
(1921). 
 117  Id. at 586.  
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payment sought represented “solace for injured feelings or affronted dignity,” not 
compensation for economic loss.118 A wide variety of wrongs came to be 
encompassed by the actio iniuriarum, related by the fact that they showed contempt 
of the victim’s personality or tended to disparage him, or were intended to do so.119  
The delict of iniuria has its origins in Gaius’s Institutes 3.220, describing an 
iniuria as committed when a person is struck, vocally attacked, or subject to 
defamatory conduct, including writing, sexual harassment, and miscellaneous other 
examples.120 Peter Birks, similarly, argues that the delict iniuria protected “one’s fair 
share of respect.”121 Birks summarized the delict of iniuria as comprising four 
elements: (1) an act of harassment, in its broad meaning, (iniuria) by the tortfeasor; 
(2) carried out by the tortfeasor with contempt; (3) typically causing harm to the 
victim in the nature of “anger and humiliation (the desire for revenge, joined with 
grief)”; and (4) violating “the victim’s right to his or her proper share of respect.”122 
An important rider attaches to the delict, namely that the tortfeasor’s conduct be 
iniuria, i.e., non-iure, not lawful or “unlawful.”123  
This Praetorian remedy was for what we would call damages, although the 
essence of the delict was not economic loss but insult. Therefore, the money 
payment must usually have represented not compensation in the ordinary sense, but 
rather solace for injured feelings or affronted dignity.124 Barry Nicholas narrates the 
development of this Praetorian remedy, based on the story related by Mitchell, when 
the fall in the value of money deprived the fixed penalties in the Twelve Tables of 
their efficacy: a Roman followed by his slave with a purse went about slapping the 
faces of respectable persons and bidding the slave to tender to each the statutory 
penalty.125 This, we are told, drove the Praetors to intervene,126 which they did by 
providing an action not for a fixed penalty, but for damages at large.127  
2. The Reception of Iniuria into the English Common Law via Early Development 
of Defamation 
By the time of Emperor Justinian in the sixth century, Roman law was compiled 
into the Corpus Iuris Civilis. This body of law, which attempted to codify and 
abridge the sources of law from the “classical period” of Roman law, including 
                                                           
 118  NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 217. 
 119  BUCKLAND, supra note 116, at 585. 
 120  On the delict of iniuria, see G. INST., supra note 111, at 3.220; see also DIG. 47.10; J. 
INST., supra note 115, at 4.4; CODE JUST. 9.35 (Diocletian & Maximian 290); J. A. C. THOMAS, 
TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 369-72 (1976); NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 216. 
 121  Birks, supra note 112, at 10. 
 122  Id. at 7-11. 
 123  Id. at 11. 
 124  NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 217.  
 125  Id. at 216-17. 
 126  DIG. 47.10.15.26 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 67). 
 127  NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 216-17; see also Peter B. H. Birks, The Early History of 
Iniuria, 37 LEGAL HIST. REV. 163, 174-175 (1969) (discussing this story of Lucius Veratius as 
reported by Gellius and attributed to Labeo). 
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Gaius’s Institutes, forbade reference to the earlier law.128 The renewed study of 
Justinianic Roman law, after more than half a millennium of neglect, occurred in the 
1100s in Bologna, Italy.129 This was Roman law according to the Justinian 
compilations of ancient text-writers, rather than the ancient texts of the jurists 
themselves.130 Justinian’s Institutes 4.4 (De iniuriis), heavily reliant on Gaius’s 
earlier text, emphasized that the notion of contempt rendered the iniuria 
actionable.131 Although it did not form a coherent body of doctrine identifiable with 
the modern descendants of defamation, it stated that, “anyone who shall formulate a 
writing or slanderous words publicly against the reputation of another, if he does not 
prove the writing, shall be whipped.”132  
The precursor to the action of defamation was the action on the case for words, 
which emerged in the sixteenth century.133 Prior to this time, actions for harmful 
words were dealt with under two canon law “regimes.”134 One of these regimes was 
based on the texts from the Decretum and Justinian’s Institutes, and the related 
canonistic commentary that emerged after 1140,135 namely the canon law collections 
the Decretals (1234) of Gregory IX, also called the Liber Extra, the Liber Sextus 
(1298), issued by Boniface VIII, and the commentaries on these texts.136 The other 
was the 1222 statute Auctoritate dei patris, a provincial constitution that 
excommunicated any person who maliciously imputed another of a crime.137 The 
influence of the earlier canon law on the drafting of the provisions of the statute that 
took place at the Council of Oxford statute is “quite possible,” according to 
                                                           
 128  JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 6-7 (3d ed. 2007); see 
also NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 42-43. 
 129  ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN’S DECRETUM 149 (2000). 
 130  But the texts within the Justinianic corpus itself were received into medieval Western 
Europe in the twelfth century at different times and in variants, for example the Florentina 
and the Vulgata manuscripts of the Digest. See Harry Dondorp & Elto J. H. Schrage, The 
Sources of Medieval Learned Law, in THE CREATION OF THE IUS COMMUNE: FROM CASUS TO 
REGULA 7, 13-15 (John W. Cairns & Paul J. du Plessis eds., 2010). 
 131  J. INST., supra note 115, at 4.4.6 (“nisi in contumeliam tuam pulsatus sit, tunc enim 
competit et tibi iniuriarum actio.”). 
 132  R. H. HELMHOLZ, SELECT CASES ON DEFAMATION TO 1600 xvii (1985) [hereinafter 
HELMHOLZ, DEFAMATION] (quoting C.5 q.1 c.1) (translating “[q]ui in alterius famam publice 
scripturam aut uerba contumeliosa confinxerit, et repertus scripta non probauerit, flagelletur”). 
 133  See 1 R. H. HELMHOLZ, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: THE CANON 
LAW AND ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION FROM 597 TO THE 1640S 572, 590 (2004) [hereinafter 
HELMHOLZ, OXFORD HISTORY]; see also Van Vechten Veeder, The History of the Law of 
Defamation, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 446, 448 (John Henry 
Wigmore et al. eds., 1909); Frank Carr, The English Law of Defamation (pt. 2), 18 L.Q. REV. 
388, 393 (1902); Colin Rhys Lovell, The “Reception” of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 
VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1052-58 (1962). 
 134  HELMHOLZ, OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 133, at 562-72. 
 135  Id. at 567-72. 
 136  Id. at 94. 
 137  Id. at 572. 
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Helmholz.138 This is more likely given that a church council convoked by the 
Archbishop of Canterbury Stephen Langton, a man deeply learned in canon law, 
passed the statute.139  
This statute provided a narrower ground of action than, and was independent of, 
the grounds in the Decretum. It did not replace the earlier canon law principles, but 
sharpened them. The canon law texts and commentaries adopted the Roman law 
concept of iniuria as one of the ways a person might be injured, through contumelia 
(hurting the feelings of others), while the statute of Auctoritate dei patris confined 
itself strictly to the imputation of crime.140  
One prominent canon law commentator, Hostiensis, observed that the English 
ecclesiastical courts were merely fulfilling the supplementary role enjoined on them 
by canon law in the Liber Extra.141 Helmholz supports this by noting the operation of 
the two schemas in complementary ways, as evidenced by proof of maliciose, or 
malice, by the person making the imputation of crime under the statute.142 Although 
this involved subjective questions of motive, this malice might be constructively 
imputed from the nature of the words without proof of actual malice. Non-canon law 
legal sources also support the existence of intentionality in inuria. The Ordinary 
Gloss to one of the relevant titles in the Code dealing with iniuria (De iniuriis) 
provided for a presumption that the defendant intended iniuria where certain words 
were used that gave rise to a necessary implication of it.143 Received principles on a 
judge’s discretion to make a finding of iniuria in Roman law also had application in 
this context for attributing the appropriate motive of malice.144  
In practice, plaintiffs litigated actions for words in the ecclesiastical courts, 
although some were heard in the criminal courts. This trend reversed around 1500, 
when secular and royal courts experienced a revival in the number of defamation 
cases in their jurisdictions.145 The reversal was brought about by a series of actions 
in the early 1500s that heightened the jurisdictional demarcation between the two 
spheres.  
This jurisdictional separation was on the basis of the underlying wrongdoing 
being either secular or ecclesiastical. Thus, the Church was restricted to entertaining 
defamation cases only when the underlying matter was wholly spiritual.146 There is 
evidence that this demarcation may have occurred in practice by the last two decades 
                                                           
 138  HELMHOLZ, DEFAMATION, supra note 132, at xvii. 
 139  HELMHOLZ, OXFORD HISTORY, supra note 133, at 133. 
 140  HELMHOLZ, DEFAMATION, supra note 132, at xix.  
 141  Id. at xix n.1 (citing HOSTIENSIS, LECTURA AD X 2.2.11 (Ex tenore), no. 9).  
 142  Id. at xxxii. 
 143  Id. at xxxii n.4 (citing GLOSSA ORDINARIA AD CODEX 9.35.5 (Si non convicii) s.v. 
probare potes); LYNDWOOD, PROVINCIALE, 263 s.v. iniuriose)). 
 144  Id. at xxxii n.5 (citing DURANTIS, SPECULUM IUDICIALE, IV, tit. De iniuriis et damno 
dato, § Scias s.v. concipitur).  
 145  Id. at xliii-xlv. 
 146  This was how the courts interpreted the Statute of Praemunire, 16 Ric. 2 c. 5. See 
HELMHOLZ, DEFAMATION, supra note 132, at xliii. 
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of the fifteenth century or as early as the fourteenth century.147 Although this 
resulted in a loss of litigation by the ecclesiastical courts to the secular courts, it did 
not spell the demise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over actions for words altogether, 
and litigation increased, or at least remained steady, in that sphere in the end of the 
sixteenth century.  
Despite this revival of the secular courts, prior influences remained. The forms of 
pleading used were borrowed from pre-1500 forms used in respect of the Auctoritate 
dei patris statute, while several cases from the early 1500s show evidence of 
pleadings that were copied from an ecclesiastical formulary, or precedent book.148 
This was accompanied by one important development in the form of pleading at 
canon law that was quite separate from the Auctoritate dei patris: that any convicium 
(vocal attack) tending to the diminution of the good fame or status of the plaintiff 
could be punishable by ecclesiastical sanctions.149 This put the ecclesiastical courts 
“in the position of enforcing something like the actio iniuriarum of Roman law 
adopted by medieval canonists.”150  
In the local courts, defamation causes were treated the same way as physical 
actions, namely as trespasses, thus treating slander as one of the many ways iniuria 
might occur. This is evident in several matters in which a plaintiffs’ pleadings set out 
the damages in precisely the formula of the actio iniuriarum.151 The secular courts 
provided no remedy at all to the early cases of defamation, while the ecclesiastical 
courts provided the penalty of excommunication.152  
This changed when the secular courts experienced a revival in the number of 
defamation cases they heard after 1500 and began to offer successful claimants 
monetary damages.153 In fact, a plaintiff did not have to prove actual loss suffered 
but merely the utterance of certain words, which, once proven to be spoken, raised a 
presumption that loss had been suffered.154 The case was then left to the jury to 
ascertain the amount of that loss.155 As discussed, the jury had a great deal of 
independence in awarding damages, but were under some restrictions.156 Introducing 
iniuria as an underlying justification for damages awards ameliorates the difficulty 
of ascertaining legal doctrine in the context of questions of fact concerning damages 
awards by juries. So, while the sixteenth century witnessed an upsurge in action on 
the case litigation being heard in royal courts, this did not mean its cessation in 
ecclesiastical courts. In fact, the two canon law schemas, dealing with actions for 
                                                           
 147  HELMHOLZ, DEFAMATION, supra note 132, at xliii n.6 (citing Case of the Abbot of St. 
Alban’s, Y. B. Trin. 22 Edw. IV (1482), f. 20, pl. 47); see also id. at xlvii-xlix.  
 148  Id. at lxxii. 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. at xlvi. 
 151  Id. at li, lii, lxv.  
 152  Id. at xiv, lxviii. 
 153  MITCHELL, supra note 87, at 53. 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. 
 156  See supra Part I.  
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words, continued to develop doctrinally based on the Roman law notion of iniuria. 
This concept informed local courts in their treatment of defamation matters. Thus, 
the link between the law of proto-defamation under the canon law texts and the 
statute Auctoritate dei patris with the notion of iniuria continued well beyond the 
thirteenth century.157  
The influence of Roman iniuria must be considered alongside the related 
phenomenon of “multiple” damages. The iniuria action in Roman law was not for a 
fixed penalty, but for damages at large.158 This delictual action was classified as 
penal (ad poenam persequendam), meaning it commonly resulted in the payment of 
more than compensation. This was in contrast to all other delictual actions, whether 
in rem or in personam, which were ad rem persequendam, meaning they commonly 
resulted in the payment of compensation only.159  
E. Multiple Damages in Thirteenth-Century Statutes  
The main lines of debate in tracing the lineage of exemplary damages in legal 
history are indebted to the account of the incomparable Frederic William Maitland. 
On the phenomenon of exemplary damages in his seminal History of the English 
Law in chapter 8 on crime and tort, Maitland notes that it was “a favourite device” of 
legislators during the reign of King Edward I of “giving double or treble damages to 
‘the party [ag]grieved’. . . it took the form of manyfold reparation, or penal and 
exemplary damages.”160 The footnote to this passage makes reference to provisions 
from three thirteenth-century statutes.  
The first is the “double damages” provision appearing in “a crude form” in the 
Statute of Merton states that if a male ward marries without the lord’s consent, the 
lord may hold the land for an additional period so as to obtain twice the value of that 
of which he has been deprived.161 The marriage gift or “marriage portion” was given 
with the bride, usually to the groom’s lord in the case of a ward, or the groom’s 
family in the case of non-ward.162 Second, is the Statute of Westminster I in which 
                                                           
 157  Ironically, as Beckerman has noted, by the time of this “receiving” of the doctrine of 
defamation into the common law in the sixteenth century as the action on the case for words, 
tort liability in trespass and case had long excluded solace for injured feelings (solatium) or 
pecuniary retribution for affronted honor, both inherent in the notion of iniuria. Beckerman, 
supra note 115, at 181. He therefore argues that the common-law remedies for libel and 
slander after the sixteenth century developed with a much different jurisprudential framework 
from the Roman actio iniuriarum. Id.  
 158  NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 216-17.  
 159  Id. at 210.  
 160  2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDRIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 522 (2d ed. 1968). 
 161  Statute of Merton, 20 Hen. 3 c. 6, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 1, 3 (reprt. ed. 1963) 
(duplice valore maritagii). On the limitations of the translations and editions of the statutes in 
this work, see generally THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, STATUTES & THEIR INTERPRETATION IN 
THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY (reprt. ed. 2013). Note that Chapter 6 provides 
the sole relief to the plaintiff lord; there is no additional measure of fine, amercement, or 
imprisonment by the King, unlike some of the other provisions discussed below. 
 162  For more information on the maritagium, see BAKER, supra note 52, at 310-11; 2 JOHN 
HUDSON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 871-1216, 787-91 (2012). See also 
THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED 
 
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
274 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:251 
 
“double or treble damages are lavishly distributed.”163 These provisions will be 
further discussed below.164 The third example is of “heavy punishment inflicted on a 
civil action” from the Statute of Westminster II: An action for “ravishment of ward” 
may lead to the perpetual imprisonment of the defendant if he does not pay for the 
maritagium.165  Also relevant to the three statutes mentioned by Maitland, is a fourth 
statute, the Statute of Gloucester, which awarded treble damages for “waste.”166 
Thus, a key moment in tracing the origins of punitive damages is the thirteenth-
century statutes, all of which provided for multiple “damages” in certain cases of 
wrongdoing.  
1. Statute of Westminster I (1275) 
The multiple damages provisions in the First Statute of Westminster are indeed 
“lavish.”167 The multiple damages provisions in the earlier Statute of Merton and the 
later Second Statute of Westminster both relate to the phenomenon of maritagium, 
while the Statute of Gloucester’s reference to such damages is in regard to waste.168 
Those in the first Statute of Westminster of 1275, however, relate to a much wider 
range of wrongdoing.  
The statute was drafted during the reign of King Edward I, shortly after his return 
from the Ninth Crusade and coronation the year before. His first Parliament met on 
April 22, 1275 at Westminster; its main work was the consideration of the Statute of 
Westminster I. This was drawn up, not in Latin, but in Norman French, and was 
passed “par le assentement des erceveskes, eveskes, abbes, priurs, contes, barons, et 
la communaute de la tere ileokes somons.”169 Burnell may have played a leading role 
                                                           
GLANVILL 138 (G.D.G. Hall ed., trans., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter GLANVILL] (the “reasonable 
share” or rationabilis partum); 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 77 n.21 
(Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968) [hereinafter BRACTON]. 
 163  POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 522; Statute of Westminster I 1275, 3 Edw. 
I, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 26 (reprt. ed. 1963).  
 164  See infra Part II.E.1. 
 165  Statute of Westminster II 1285, 13 Edw. 1 c. 35, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 88 
(reprt. ed. 1963); see also POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 522 n.1. 
 166  Statute of Gloucester 1278, 6 Edw. 1 c. 5, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 48 (reprt. ed. 
1963). “Waste” was the substantial destruction or cutting down of “forests, woods, or any 
thickets suitable as food or lair.” HUDSON, supra note 162, at 409 (quoting RICHARD 
FITZNIGEL, DIALOGUS DE SCACCARIO: THE DIALOGUE OF THE EXCHEQUER 92 (Emile Amt & 
S.D. Church eds., trans., 2007)). 
 167  POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 522. 
 168  See id. at 522. Compare Statute of Westminster 1285, 13 Edw. 1, in 1 THE STATUTES OF 
THE REALM, supra note 168, at 88, with Statute of Gloucester 1278, 6 Edw. 1, in 1 THE 
STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 169, at 48. 
 169  SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: 
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE REIGN OF EDWARD THE FIRST 450 (William Stubbs, ed., 6th 
ed., 1874). 
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in this legislation, since he held the office of chancellor from September 21, 1274 
until his death in 1292, and his influence on the King well attested.170  
Ten provisions of this statute refer to multiple damages. It is convenient to divide 
the possible damages into four categories based on the offense: (1) trespass against 
the property or goods of a religious house; (2) abuse of office by sheriffs or other 
local or royal officials; (3) causing loss to animals taken in a replevin action; and (4) 
extortion by barons or bailiffs beyond their jurisdiction. 
a. Trespass Against the Property or Goods of a Religious House: Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 of the Statute of Westminster I sought to prevent the abuse by 
uninvited guests of the charity, and welcome them as visitors to religious houses. It 
expresses the concept of the “peace of the Church,” which was being disturbed at 
this point in time.171 It provides that religious houses need not provide food, 
lodgings, or anything else to uninvited visitors unless the visitor was in dire need or 
the religious house agreed to provide something. Chapter 1 makes it an actionable 
trespass against those who cause any “door, lock, nor window, nor nothing that is 
shut, to be opened or broken” in a religious house, or to take away any goods or food 
from that religious house without consent of that house.172  
If the trespasser fails to pay compensation for the damage, that trespasser will be 
imprisoned by the king and fined “according to the quantity and manner of the 
trespass, and after as the king in his Court may think convenient.”173 Significantly, if 
the religious house sues for the trespass, “damages will be awarded to them, and they 
shall be awarded and restored to the double.”174 Further, following annual inquests 
by the king into such trespasses, those indicted must appear in the King’s Court.175 
Failure to do so made them “atteinted” and required “double damages” at the king’s 
suit to those who suffered damage, as well as a grievous fine. The extra fine 
                                                           
 170  MICHAEL PRESTWICH, EDWARD I 233 (1997). Alan Harding agrees, but is more 
circumspect:  
Because he [Robert Burnell] was so constantly with Edward, there is little written 
evidence of his relationship with the king, or of his part in the genesis of the great 
administrative and legal measures of the first half of the reign. It is significant, 
however, that Burnell's chancellorship coincided exactly with the period of Edwardian 
statute making, and no one but the chancellor could have had responsibility for 
instituting the series of administrative inquiries and handling the growing stream of 
petitions to the crown that together provided the basis for legislation in parliament.  
Alan Harding, Burnell, Robert (d. 1292), OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NAT’L BIOGRAPHY, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4055 (last visited Jan. 18, 2016). 
 171  Statute of Westminster I 1275, 3 Edw. I c. 1, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 26 (reprt. 
ed. 1963) 
 172  Id.  
 173  Id. 
 174  Id. (les damages qui il averunt eus, lor serra [regarde] e returne al double). 
 175  Id. 
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provided for under the first Statute of Westminster has further significance in that the 
Statute of Merton provided for multiple damages, but no fine.176 
b. Sheriffs’ or Other Local or Royal Officials’ Abuse of Office: Chapters 15, 19, 24, 
26, 27, 30, 32 
These seven provisions are royal measures taken against corrupt officials. In all 
of the provisions, either one or more of a fine, amercement, or other penalty 
accompanies the multiple damages component. Chapter 15 provides that sheriffs or 
other officials, among other punishments, must pay to the prisoner double any 
reward (i.e., bribe) wrongfully received by him for delivering a prisoner who is 
“replevisible.”177 That is, a prisoner who has paid the required surety is to be 
released, similar to the payment of bail. In addition, the sheriff shall pay an 
amercement to the king if the prisoner had paid sufficient surety.178 Alternatively, 
that same sheriff, should he release a prisoner that is not “replevisable,” “shall lose 
his Fee and Office for ever,” or suffer three years imprisonment and “make Fine at 
the King’s Pleasure” if the release is “contrary to the Will of his Lord.”179 In like 
manner, Chapter 26 provides that any sheriff or other king’s officer, who accepts any 
“reward” other than their payment from the king, must pay “twice as much.”180 In 
addition, that official shall “be punished at the King’s Pleasure.”181  
 Chapter 19, which also deals with sheriffs, provides that a sheriff is to pay to a 
debtor three times what he receives from that debtor after pursuing the debtor when 
the debt has already been paid; likewise any other person who does so must pay such 
an amount.182 This provision requires the Sheriff to acquit royal debts in the 
Exchequer, and failure to do so means that Sheriff shall be “atteinted” and pay the 
plaintiff debtor “thrice as much as he had received” and “shall make Fine at the 
Kings Pleasure.”183 The chapter also provides that any other person, who collects 
royal debts and acquits them before the Exchequer, fails to acquit them and “shall 
render thrice so much to the Plaintiff, and make Fine in like manner.”184  
Chapter 24 related to unlawful possession of property, including land. It provided 
that “double damages” were payable to a plaintiff for unlawful disseisin of freehold 
or anything belonging to the freehold by escheators or other officials “by colour of 
his Office.”185 It is then at the election of the disseisee (person disseised) that either 
                                                           
 176  See Statute of Merton 1235, 20 Hen. 3 c. 6, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 1-11 (reprt. 
ed. 1963). 
 177  Statute of Westminster I 1275, 3 Edw. I c. 15, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 30 (reprt. 
ed. 1963). The term “replevisible” is used as the English translation of the Old French word 
“replivisables.” 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id. 
 180  3 Edw. I c. 26, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 33 (reprt. ed. 1963). 
 181  Id. 
 182  3 Edw. I c. 19, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 32 (reprt. ed. 1963). 
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. 
 185  3 Edw. I c. 24, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 33 (reprt. ed. 1963). 
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the king can commence office proceedings to amend the disseisin or the disseisee 
brings a writ of novel disseisin at common law. “[H]e that is attainted thereof shall 
pay double Damages (il rendra [les damages] <le double> a mesme le pleintif) to 
the Plaintiff, and shall be grievously amerced unto the King.”186    
Chapter 27 required that any clerk other than a Clerk of the Justices in Eyre or a 
Clerk of the Justices in Eyre who took more than the specified amount for delivering 
“chapiters” must pay triple what he took.187 In addition, the official is punished with 
a one-year suspension.188 In a similar vein, according to Chapter 30, an official must 
repay in triple any amounts taken by extortion.189 In particular, this penalty applied 
to Justices Marshals, who, in addition to being “grievously punished at the King’s 
Pleasure,” must “pay unto [all] Complainants the treble Value (rendra la treble de 
ceo qil avera issi pris) of that they have received in such manner.”190 
In Chapter 32, those who “take part of the King’s Debts, or other Rewards of the 
King’s Creditors for to make payment of the same Debt,” must pay double that 
sum.191 Thus, those officials who took food or other things for the king’s use and, 
after having received payment from the king via the Exchequer, withheld it from the 
creditors “to their great damage, and slander of the King,” must pay double and 
“shall be imprisoned at the King’s Will.”192  
c. Causing Loss to Animals Taken in a Replevin Action: Chapter 17 
Replevin was the “usual method of review” in the time of Edward I by which the 
tenant could seek to recover his chattels that had been distrained by the lord, most 
often an extra-judicial self-help means of enforcing the lord’s entitlement to services 
against the tenant.193 The action of replevin required the lord, via the intervention of 
the sheriff, to restore the tenant’s goods to the tenant when the tenant gave surety to 
bring an action and restore the goods if he lost—that is, the impounded goods were 
not to be sold or exploited and should be released, when the distrained person gave 
pledges to appear in court.194  
                                                           
 186  Id. Either “le double” or “al duble.” Id. at 33 n.7.  
 187  3 Edw. I c. 27, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 33 (reprt. ed. 1963). Coke renders the Old 
French as “chapiters.” EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF 
ENGLAND 161 (Garland 1979) (1642). However, 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 33 (reprt. ed. 
1963) has “chapitres” and provides the English translation “Chapiters.” Coke explains that, in 
proceedings before the Justices in Eyre, after twelve knights or free men were sworn in, “then 
were read to them the Chapters or Articles of their charge in writing indented, the one part 
whereof was delivered to them, and the other part remained with the Justices.” COKE, supra 
note 187, at 211. 
 188  3 Edw. I c. 27, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 33 (reprt. ed. 1963). 
 189  3 Edw. I c. 30, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 34 (reprt. ed. 1963). 
 190  Id. 
 191  3 Edw. I c. 32, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 34 (reprt. ed. 1963). 
 192  Id. 
 193  Id. at 223. 
 194  HUDSON, supra note 162, at 638 (citing D. W. SUTHERLAND, THE ASSIZE OF NOVEL 
DISSEISIN 84 (1973)). Note that replevin was the standard method of review not just of the 
seigniorial use of distraint but also of the use of distraint by others, of which the most frequent 
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By means of Chapter 17, a plaintiff was entitled to double damages for any losses 
to his animals that were the subject of a replevin action. Further, the failure to deliver 
the animals under replevin has the consequence that the castle or fortress where the 
animals were chased is to be “beaten down without Recovery” and “all the Damages 
that the Plaintiff hath sustained in his Beasts . . . after the first Demand made by the 
Sheriff or Bailiff, of the beasts, shall be restored to him the double [by the Lord, or] 
by him that took the Beasts, if he have whereof.”195 Again, other penalties could 
additionally apply to the imposition of multiple damages. 
d. Barons or Bailiffs Committing Extortion Beyond Their Jurisdiction: Chapter 35 
In Chapter 35, double damages were payable where “Great Men and their 
Bailiffs” and others extort payment in excess of their jurisdiction and without 
“especial authority.”196 In addition, those liable are to be “grievously amerced to the 
King.”197 The wrong here is the taking of legal action by these great men and bailiffs 
against persons in circumstances that imply usurping of royal jurisdiction, that is, “in 
Prejudice of the King and his Crown, and to the Damage of the People.”198  
These provisions in the Statute of Westminster I, dealing mostly with abuses of 
royal officials and delegates and interference with property such as land and goods 
(including animals), are significant. This is because the instances of multiple 
damages occur in addition to and independently of other “punitive” measures, such 
as imprisonment, fines, or amercement, and in addition to any compensatory 
damages. 
2. Roman Law Influence on Thirteenth-Century Statutes  
Instances of statutorily imposed penalties representing payment to the victim of a 
multiple of the actual loss sustained have existed in pre-Western ancient cultures for 
millennia. Scholarly accounts of the history of punitive damages begin with the 
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi of c. 1772 BCE, one of the oldest deciphered 
writings of significant length in the world. In the Code of Hammurabi, punitive 
damages, in the sense of multiple damages, were payable for offences, such as 
stealing cattle (from a temple, thirty-fold; from a freeman, ten-fold), a merchant 
cheating his agent (six times the amount), or a common carrier failing to deliver 
goods (five-fold their value).199  
Likewise, under the Hittite Law of 1400 BCE, one who stole a “great” bull or 
horse had to repay the owner multiple restitution (fifteen bulls).200 The Hindu Code 
of Manu in 200 BCE, in cases of perjury, theft, and evasion of duties payable on 
                                                           
type was of animals found grazing on arable land or pasture without good reason. See E-mail 
from Professor Paul Brand, All-Souls College, Oxford University, to Jason Taliadoros (Sept. 
15, 2014) (on file with author). 
 195  3 Edw. I c. 17, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 31 (reprt. ed. 1963). 
 196  3 Edw. I c. 35, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 35 (reprt. ed. 1963). 
 197  Id.  
 198  Id.  
 199  1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 2-3 (6th ed. 2010). 
 200  Id. 
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goods, also required multiple restitution.201 Similarly, there is evidence that ancient 
Greek law provided multiple damages, as did Ptolemaic law in Egypt.202  
These pre-modern “statutes” specify damages that are characterized by the 
following: (1) the amount of the damages are beyond mere compensation for the loss 
sustained; (2) the amount of damages is a fixed multiple of the loss, depending on 
the nature of the offence; (3) the damages are payable to the victim and so are 
distinct from fines or penalties payable to the ruler or a regulating or administrative 
body; and (4) the damages express outrage at the nature of the offence, that is, 
society’s disapproval of that conduct and its deterrence of such conduct in the future. 
Jolowicz further explains multiple damages in pre-modern laws: “The penalty is 
made to fit, not the amount of damage inflicted by the tort, but the nature of the tort 
itself. In other words, the principle of appropriateness, not . . . reparation, is the 
guiding one.”203 
Roman law, from its very beginnings, recognized that a wrongdoer might be 
liable to make payments to the victim for an amount beyond the actual harm 
suffered. The Twelve Tables, composed in the mid-fifth-century BCE, provided 
several examples of multiple damages, in the form of fixed money payments, such as 
where a party failed to carry out a promise, or where a party was a victim of usury.204 
This multiple restitution, Jolowicz observes, is “a strong argument for the 
preponderance of the idea of fittingness over that of reparation in fixing the 
penalties.”205 Roman law recognized three “great torts:” (1) furtum, civil theft, 
relating to the wrongful distribution of wealth; (2) damnum iniuria, “wrongful 
waste,” directed against the wrongful waste of wealth; and (3) iniuria, a not-right or 
a wrong, which protected personality or personhood.206 Each allowed for multiple 
damages in the delictual action. 
As discussed above, these notions from classical Roman law were transmitted via 
Justinian’s sixth-century Corpus Iuris Civilis into the medieval West, including 
England. This delictual action was penal and commonly resulted in the payment of 
more than compensation.207 In terms of civil theft, a furtum nec manifestum (a thief 
by night or “non-manifest theft”) involved double payment, while a manifest theft or 
furtum manifestum, by day, involved a higher fourfold money payment.208 The 
victim of a theft could demand to make a search with witnesses of any premises on 
which he thought the goods were hidden.209 If the search was refused, he could exact 
a fourfold penalty from the occupier. If the search was allowed, and the goods were 
                                                           
 201  Id. at 228. 
 202  H. F. Jolowicz, The Assessment of Penalties in Primitive Law, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL 
ESSAYS WRITTEN IN HONOUR OF AND PRESENTED TO DOCTOR BOND, PROFESSOR BUCKLAND 
AND PROFESSOR KENNY 203, 205-08, 216 (Percy H. Winfield & Arnold McNair eds., 1926).   
 203  Id. at 203-22.   
 204  NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 216. 
 205  Jolowicz, supra note 202, at 219. 
 206  Birks, supra note 112, at 5-6. 
 207  J. INST., supra note 115, at 1.5. 
 208  Id. at 1.5, 1.19(21). 
 209  NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 212. 
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found, the occupier of the premises was liable to a threefold penalty even if he knew 
nothing of the matter.210 The victim could also obtain a threefold penalty from the 
man who left the goods on the premises, but only if he did so to avoid detection.211  
In terms of damnum iniuria or “wrongful waste,” this was dealt with in the 
Digest 9.2 on the Lex Aquilia, a plebiscite promulgated by a Tribune of the Plebeian, 
Aquilius, between 286 and 195 BCE. A text from Gaius on the Lex Aquilia provides 
that “[a]n action for double damages may be brought against a person who makes a 
denial”.212 Digest 9.2.23 states: “Where a slave is killed through malice [dolo], it is 
established that his owner can also bring suit under criminal process by the Lex 
Cornelia [de iniuriis],” which punished three kinds of injury committed by violence, 
namely pulsare (beating), verberare (striking), and domum introire (forcible 
invasion of one’s home)],213 and if he proceeds under the Lex Aquilia, his suit under 
the Lex Cornelia will not be barred.214 Further on, Digest 9.2.27 states: “If anyone 
castrates a boy slave, and thereby renders him more valuable, Vivianus says that the 
Lex Aquilia does not apply, but that an action can be brought for injury [iniuriarum 
erit agendum], either under the Edict of the aediles, or for fourfold damages [in 
quadruplum].”215 
F. The Reception of Iniuria and Statutory Multiple Damages into the Common Law 
Maitland implies that the statutes may have been the result of influence from 
Roman law sources, referring to the broad categorization of actions in Institutes 
4.6.21.216 Maitland does not venture a firm opinion on this issue. Nor does he trace 
the lines of influence that might have led to this influence. Scholarship dealing with 
the influence of Continental legal learning on the English common law posits several 
sources of influence.  
In the late twelfth century, the Liber pauperum of Master Vacarius is evidence of 
a school of Justinianic Roman law learning in England. The thirteenth century 
witnessed an expanded number of texts of this law that would have been known to 
clerks in the schools and who worked in ecclesiastical households. Peter Stein notes 
the existence of a “standard package or kit” of Justinianic law learning in England 
around 1200, which comprised the following: (1) Vacarius’s textbook, the Liber 
pauperum, containing epitomized excerpts of the Code and the Digest, with gloss 
spaces containing further excerpts from these titles; (2) the Institutes, with glosses, 
the fundamental learning textbook of Roman law; (3) titles Digest 50.15 and 50.17, 
the first a list of definitions or explanations of certain terms, the second a list of 
maxims or rules; (3) another work on maxims, such as the Brocardica Dolum; and 
finally (4) a work on Romano-canonical procedure, such as the Ulpianus de edendo 
                                                           
 210  Id. 
 211  Id. at 210; see also 2 FRANCIS DE ZULUETA, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 201 (1953). 
 212  DIG. 9.2.2.1 (Gaius, On the Provincial Edict 7). 
 213  ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 549 (1953) (defining 
“lex Cornelia de inuriis”); see also J. A. C. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 371 (1976). 
 214  DIG. 9.2.23.9 (Ulpianus, On the Edict 18). 
 215  DIG. 9.2.27.28 (Ulpianus, On the Edict 18). 
 216  “Omnes autem actiones vel in simplum conceptae sunt vel in duplum vel in triplum vel 
in quadruplum: ulterius autem nulla actio extenditur.” J. INST. 4.6.21. 
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or the Olim edebatur actio.217 This full kit, or a variation of it, is evidenced by a 
number of manuscripts from the beginning of the thirteenth century.218  
Stein also observes that a similar kit, with the addition of the Decretales, appears 
to exist around 1300 in a priory near Canterbury (Eastry).219 This indicates that there 
may have been a continuous tradition from around 1200 to 1300 of such kits in 
circulation and use, pointing to an ongoing influence of the Roman law learning in 
England from the late twelfth right through the end of the thirteenth century.220 
Supporting the contention that there was a school of Justinianic Roman law learning 
in England at or around this time, Stein also refers to the popularity of Johannes 
Bassianus in England around 1200, as is evident from his commentary on the 
Institutes forming the first substratum for the Vacarian Lectura super Institutiones; 
Stein even postulates that Bassianus may have been in England in the 1190s, but 
puts forward no evidence in support of this.221 
On the reception of Roman law in England, Maitland focused on Bracton. His 
main concern was whether Bracton was aware of the distinction between crime and 
tort. He concludes that Bracton did not evince a clear distinction between the two.222 
This is despite Bracton recognizing the difference between compensatory remedies 
and penalties:  
Some personal actions arising ex maleficio pursue the penalty only, as the 
actio furti, some the thing and the penalty, as the action vi bonorum 
raptorum, and thus are double, since they are recuperatory [or 
‘reipersecutory’, namely they result in payment of compensation only]223 
and penal, and thus [mixed] both in rem and in personam.224  
However, in explaining the assize of novel disseisin, the Bracton treatise notes 
that it is personal, not public, since it is only against the disseisor, but penal because 
it was done “wrongfully and without judgment,” and reipersecutory.225  
                                                           
 217  FRANCIS DE ZULUETA & PETER STEIN, THE TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW IN ENGLAND 
AROUND 1200 xliii (1990). 
 218  Id. 
 219  Id. at xliii (citing M. R. JAMES, THE ANCIENT LIBRARIES OF CANTERBURY AND DOVER 
94-95, 106 (1903)). 
 220  See John S. Beckerman, Law Writing and Law Teaching: Treatise Evidence of the 
Formal Teaching of Law in Late Thirteenth Century England, in LEARNING THE LAW: 
TEACHING AND THE TRANSMISSION OF ENGLISH LAW, 1150-1900, 1, 33-50 (Jonathan A. Bush 
& Alain Wijffels eds., 1999) (discussing evidence of treatise/formulary literature in formal 
law teaching in England before 1300). 
 221  DE ZULUETA & STEIN, supra note 217, at l. 
 222  POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 523. 
 223  NICHOLAS, supra note 102, at 210. 
 224  BRACTON, supra note 162, at 291 (“Personales vero actiones quae nascuntur ex 
malificio, aliae persequuntur poenam tantum ut actio furti, aliae vero persequuntur ipsam rem 
et poenam sicut actio vi bonorum raptorum, et ita sint duplices eo quod sunt rei persecutoriae 
et poena, et ita tam in rem quam in personam.”).  
 225  Id. at 324 (“Item actio civilis cum aliquando triplex sit et quasi mixta, scilicet 
personalis, poenalis et rei persecutoria.”).  
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The action or interdict unde vi, according as it is double, that is, 
recuperatory [reipersecutory] and penal, lies for one forcibly ejected 
against the person who forcibly ejected him for recovering the possession 
of the immovable from which he was ejected [in which case it is double in 
the person of the ejector, as explained below in the portion on the assise 
of novel disseisin],  [and for a penalty], in the computation of which 
neither death nor accident excuses the ejector.226  
In sum, Bracton’s treatise, for Maitland, does not recognize a clear distinction 
between crime and tort, because, although he is aware of both the reipersecutory and 
penal elements, the double action and the triple action in the assize of novel disseisin 
clearly mix both without explanation. Nevertheless, Bracton’s treatise indicates a 
clear understanding of multiple damages for certain wrongdoing where mere 
compensation for the actual loss suffered was not adequate as a remedy. 
The anonymous Lectura super Institutiones that is attributed to a pupil of 
Vacarius and of English provenance, composed several decades earlier than 
Bracton’s treatise, also notes this difference between penal actions and compensatory 
actions. It notes that the reference in the Institutes to alie tantum penam etc (“Some 
[actions] are for a penalty only”) is to the actio doli, which, although delictual, falls 
outside the category of “penal” because it is “for the plaintiff’s interest.”227 It also 
notes in respect of Institutes 4.18 that there is a difference between public 
prosecutions, which rest on the “common right,” and “actions” on individual right.228 
Private actions sue for pecuniary penalty, while public actions aim for corporal 
punishment to be carried out.229 It comments on Institutes 4.6.21: “Some actions are 
for double damages, because they lie for double from the beginning; some are not so 
from the beginning but become so through some later fact, such as denial of liability 
or a delay in the case of legacies to sacred places.”230 This last reference to “double” 
damages is unclear as to whether it differentiates compensatory from penal actions, 
or compensatory awards representing a multiple of the actual damage suffered.  
The commentary then goes to differentiate “aedilician actions” that are available 
“to penalise our act,” unlike the noxal or pauperian action that lies only for the harm 
caused and available as a direct action; the aedilician action “arises from the owner’s 
neglect”.231 On Institutes 4.16 the Lectura notes that, for knowingly leading false 
                                                           
 226  Id. at 296 (“Actio vero sive interdictum under vi secundum quod duplex est, 
scilicet rei restitutoria et poenalis, datur contra eum qui vi deiecit, et datur ei qui vi 
deiectus est ad restitutionem possessionis rei immobilis qua quis vi deiectus est. Et 
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evidence, the pecuniary penalty “is sometimes for simple damages, sometimes for 
double, sometimes for triple or quadruple.”232 
The Lectura super Institutiones deals with multiple penalties. For example, 
“when someone delivers another’s slave to the emperor, so that he should free him; 
there is a threefold liability to the owner and fourfold to the emperor.”233 
Commenting specifically on the concept of tripli, the anonymous Lectura continues 
that this threefold liability is claimed by condictio, that is by a “statement of claim” 
in which the plaintiff details the amount and kind of money or other thing sought, his 
own action, and the party against whom he was claiming.234 But if the plaintiff’s 
claim included a larger sum than was owed to him, and he claimed fraudulently, that 
plaintiff was liable threefold.235 The same Lectura also observes of Institutes 4.9 that 
if a quadruped kills a man, 200 solidi will be paid, whereas an amount for the 
medical expenses is paid if the man is merely injured. 236  
The preceding references to the Justinianic Roman Law Lectura and its 
differentiation between compensation and penalty occur in the context of the 
widespread influence of ius commune learned law texts among literate and educated 
English writers. David Ibbetson also points to other texts, some of them available to 
Bracton and the anonymous author of the earlier Lectura super Institutiones, of 
Justinanic Roman law sources that were known in England in the thirteenth century. 
These include: (1) the Accursian gloss on the Corpus iuris civilis (known to the 
author of the Lectura super Institutiones); (2) the works of Azo, or at the very least 
his Summa Codicis, which was known to have been used by the author of Bracton; 
(3) the glosses on the Decretals by Bernard of Parma and the commentary of Pope 
Innocent IV; (4) the Speculum iudiciale of William Durandus; and (5) the canon law 
works of Hostiensis, who is believed to have spent a considerable amount of time in 
England in the 1230s and 1240s.237 Ibbetson also notes the availability of the 
Decretum of Gratian, together with glosses on it;238 procedural works, such as the 
                                                           
 232  Id. at 134.  
 233  Id. at 115 (“[U]t si seruum alienum quis principi traderet ut liberum faceret: domino 
namque condempnandus est in triplum, principi in quadruplum.”).  
 234  Id. 
 235  Id. at 115 (“Tripl(um) condi(c)tione ex lege iustin(iani) petunt. conventionis 
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 236  Id. at 125. 
 237  David Ibbetson, Civilian and Canonist Influence on the Writ of Cessavit Per Biennium, 
in LAWS, LAWYERS AND TEXTS: STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL HISTORY IN HONOUR OF PAUL 
BRAND 91, 95 (Susanne Jenks, et al., eds., 2012). 
 238  Ibbetson does not say when this would be available, but we know that Vacarius 
composed a text on marriage in the late twelfth century (c. 1164-c. 1181) that relied on a close 
reading of the Decretum, so we can estimate it was available by then. See JASON TALIADOROS, 
LAW AND THEOLOGY IN TWELFTH-CENTURY ENGLAND: THE WORKS OF MASTER VACARIUS (C. 
1115/1120-C.1200) 56-58 (2006). 
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Summa de Ordine iudicario of Ricardus Anglicus (1190s); and the Summa Aurea of 
William of Drogheda, which was also known to the author of Bracton.239 
Some Justinianic Roman jurists spent time in England in the course of the 
thirteenth century, and may have left a legacy that went beyond just their texts. 
Bishop Stubbs mentioned the Roman civil law jurist, Francis Accursius (1225–
1293), son of the famous civilian Accursius of Bologna, as possibly adding 
“technical consistency” to the local knowledge of custom and experience of others 
such as Burnell, Hengham, and Britton, in the drafting the Statute of Westminster in 
1275.240 Edward brought Francis with him to England when returning from the 
crusades prior to his coronation, and Francis Accursius served as secretary to 
Edward I between 1273 and 1281.241 The king invited him to Oxford, and in 1275 or 
1276, he read lectures on law in the university before returning to Bologna in 1282, 
where he practiced law until his death.242  
His most important scholarly work was a Casus or epitome of the New Digest 
(Digest 39.1-50.17).243 The documentary evidence for this life in England does not 
link him directly with the activities of statute- drafting,244 and it is likely that his 
engagement was for the expertise and inside knowledge that his Justinianic Roman 
law learning in Bologna could offer Edward in his diplomatic dealings.245 But, like 
                                                           
 239  Ibbetson, supra note 237, at 95. 
 240  2 WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND: IN ITS ORIGIN AND 
DEVELOPMENT 111-12 (6th ed. 1903-1906). 
 241  George L. Haskins, Francis Accursius: A New Document, 13 SPECULUM 76, 76 (1938). 
 242  Robert C. Figueira, Francesco Accursius, in 1 MEDIEVAL ITALY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
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47.4.1, 47.5.1, 47.6.2, 47.6.5, 47.6.6, 47.7, 47.8.1, 47.8.4, 47.9.1, 48.5.28, 48.10.32, 50.8.9. 
 244  George L. Haskins, Three English Documents Relating to Francis Accursius, 54 L. Q. 
REV. 87 (1938); see also George L. Haskins, The University of Oxford and the “Ius ubique 
docendi,” 56 ENG. HIST. REV. 281, 281 (1941). 
 245  George L. Haskins & Ernst H. Kantorowicz, A Diplomatic Mission of Francis 
Accursius and His Oration before Pope Nicholas II, 58 ENG. HIST. REV. 424 (1943). But Paul 
Brand opines:  
I think we now know enough about Francis Accursius to suggest that Edward I is most 
likely to have used his services principally outside England, in diplomatic exchanges 
and perhaps also for assistance in the parlement of Paris. Certainly there is little to 
suggest he was consulted or involved in the drafting of English domestic legislation, 
whose language (even when it was Latin) would have sounded very strange and 
uncouth to him. There were certainly enough other English advisers around who knew 
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Master Vacarius a century before him, we should not be too quick in dismissing his 
possible influence on the court of Edward in matters separate from just diplomatic 
ones. Haskins noted, that Accursius was not the only Italian at the Royal Court. At 
about the same time in the chancery or wardrobe of the king were Stefano di San 
Giorgio, a disciple of the “later school of literary style and associated with those 
from the inner circle of Petrus de Vinea;” while, subsequent to Stefano’s departure, 
there is evidence that another Italian clerk was involved in royal letter drafting.246 
It is striking that the various kinds of wrongdoing in Statute of Westminster I 
relate to important issues at law generally at this time, whether in Roman and canon 
law or local law. Abuse of office was a significant issue in canon law, which was 
attempting to separate individual clerics from their offices and Church property from 
personal property.247 Guardianship was also a concern in Roman law, an issue 
familiar to anyone who read the Institutes and its sections on cura and tutela.248 
Further, the provisions on trespass to a religious house had clear resonance in canon 
law on the protection of church property from secular interference.249 All these 
concerns would have been matters that anyone with ius commune training would see 
as having some obvious parallels in the English context.  
If we can accept that there is the strong suggestion of Justinianic Roman law 
influence from just before 1200 to around 1300 in England, in the form of legal 
treatises that were in circulation in the schools and ecclesiastical households and in 
the form of visiting masters from the law schools of Bologna, then the question of 
doctrinal influence on the multiple damages provisions in thirteenth-century statutes 
is no great mystery. Despite their articulation in the Norman French language that 
was used in the courts, the Roman law concepts of double and triple damages as 
applied to certain kinds of wrong were nevertheless capable of translation and 
application into this vernacular by means of local men trained in the laws.    
                                                           
some Roman law for them to have suggested the idea of multiple damages, if a Roman 
law source is needed.  
E-mail from Paul Brand, Professor of English Legal History, All Souls College, to Jason 
Taliadoros (Aug. 28, 2014) (on file with author). 
 246  Haskins & Kantorowicz, supra note 245, at 424 n.4. 
 247  Udo Wolter, The Officium in Medieval Ecclesiastical Law as a Prototype of Modern 
Administration, in LEGISLATION AND JUSTICE, THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE IN EUROPE, 
THIRTEENTH TO EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 17-36 (Antonio Padoa-Schioppa ed., 1997). 
 248  The powers of the guardian in Roman law were akin to those of a fiduciary. A guardian 
was a “protector and defender” of those placed in his charge. J. INST. 1.13.2. He was required 
to preserve the real property of the minor and restore it at the end of the guardianship. DIG. 
27.9.1(Ulpianus, On the Edict 35); see also GIGLIOLA VILLATA DI RENZO, LA TUTELA. 
INDAGINI SULLA SCUOLA DEI GLOSSATORI 271-303 (1975). This was so at canon law too. C.12 
q.1 c.1. Vacarius himself had added glosses to that effect. THE LIBER PAUPERUM OF VACARIUS 
185 (F. de Zulueta ed., 1927). 
 
 249  The phrase appellatione remota in canon law (X 2.28.53) (= 3 COMP. 2.19.11) was 
used in the context of appointment of papal judges delegate as a way of providing immediate 
redress for those whose property had been taken away by force. It restrained the right of the 
forceful takers of the property to lodge an appeal to the papal court and thereby delay justice. 
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G. Early English Custom as an Unlikely Source of Multiple Damages  
The case for the influence of Roman law on punitive damages is strong, but does 
not eliminate the possible influence of local custom. As the above discussion of the 
provisions of the Statute of Westminster I shows, some provisions indicate the 
“codification” of existing custom rather than the transplantation of outside law. For 
example, the provisions regarding replevin do no more than codify existing custom.  
Maitland—having a “bet each way”—also noted the influence of replevin as a 
possible precedent from English law for these multiple damages notions.250 Bracton 
referred to the action of replevin brought against a landlord who had detained or 
“distrained” the chattels of his tenant.251 The chattels were returnable to the tenant 
through the intervention of the sheriff if and only if the tenant gave surety “by gage 
and safe pledges” to bring an action in the king’s Court, and make payment or return 
the goods if he lost.252 The tenant, in this way, then sued the lord for taking the 
goods, and the lord “avowed” (made his claim) for the services.  
The usual context for the writ of replevin was where a lord sought to recover 
arrears of rents and services from his tenant. Replevin was the “usual method of 
review” by the time of Edward I.253 Significantly, in making his avowry of the 
distraint of a tenant, the lord could allege that the rules for one particular tenancy 
included a provision for multiplication of the rent once it had not been paid on time, 
such as a doubling thereof.254  
The custom of gavelet in the undated Customs of Kent 255 and the assize rolls, 
and related to the tenure of gavelkind, is analogous to replevin. The Customs of Kent 
state: “Let him nine Times pay, and nine Times repay the Arrears, and Five pounds 
for the detention of the Rent, before he shall have his Tenement again.”256 We can 
                                                           
 250  POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 522. 
 251  Id. at 523. 
 252  Id. at 524. 
 253  Id. at 523. Compare BRACTON, supra note 162, at 439-40 n.155, with GLANVILL, supra 
note 162, at 142 (noting that the latter presumed that the chattels were still in the distrainor’s 
hands, while the former did not). See also BAKER, supra note 52, at 271-72, 70; HUDSON, 
supra note 162, at 638. 
 254  That is, “he was to double the rent the following day and treble it the third day.” Paul 
Brand, 1300T.59: Richard of Weston v. Prior of Bermondsey and Others (unpublished 
transcript and translation) (on file with the author). “1300T.5” means it is the fifty-ninth report 
in Paul Brand’s unpublished transcripts and translations of reports of cases (plus matching 
enrolments where found) belonging (or probably belonging) to Trinity term 1300. Paul Brand 
has noted the large number of replevin cases in the thirteenth century up to the date of 1285, 
beginning with a case as early as 1194. Paul A. Brand, Legal Change in the Later Thirteenth 
Century: Statutory and Judicial Remodelling of the Action of Replevin, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
43, 51-52 (1987). 
 255  Consuetudines Cantiae, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM at 223-25 (reprt. ed. 1963); see 
also N. Neilson, Custom and the Common Law in Kent, 38 HARV. L. REV. 482, 488-89 (1925) 
(reviewing gavelet custom in Kent).  
 256  Consuetudines Cantiae, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 225 n.1 (reprt. ed. 1963). The 
words are rendered not in Old French like the rest of the statute, but in Anglo-Saxon. See  
POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 187, 271 (noting the similarity to the eleven-fold 
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see a clear case of influence of replevin or the gavelet on the provisions in Chapter 
17 of the Statute of Westminster I of 1275.257 
If the provisions of the Statute of Westminster I granting multiple damages were 
the consequence of local customs, it is surprising then that there is no widespread 
corroborating evidence linking replevin or gavelet with relief by way of multiple 
damages in terms of the Roman law concepts duplum, triplum, or quadruplum. This 
is all the more so since commentators on Edward’s thirteenth-century statutes 
emphasize that the lord-tenant relationship was a problematic one at the time. 
Powicke regards the statutes of the 1270s as a response to abuses by local and royal 
officials of rights and liberties, especially practical difficulties within the ambit of 
common law such as distraint.258  
Paul Brand regards statutes from the earlier period, the late 1230s to the late 
1260s, as part of the “baronial reform” movement; but, while this may have begun as 
a “distinctly magnate political movement,” the legal reforms enacted tended to favor 
tenants over their lords and therefore contrary to the interests of the magnates as a 
group. Brand’s research was based on the unpublished and unprinted manuscript 
material from the plea rolls and Year Books, while Powicke’s was built on printed 
sources.259     
But a search of printed sources from the twelfth to fourteenth-centuries does not 
provide evidence of the custom linking replevin or gavelet with relief by way of 
multiple damages in terms of the Roman law concepts duplum, triplum, or 
quadruplum. A search of the Year Books of reported cases under the reign of Henry 
III (1216-1272) reveals no mention of these concepts, either in the cases before the 
Common Bench for the period 1268-1272, 1274-1278, or other cases of uncertain 
dating but occurring before 1279.260 Similarly, a search of the Year Books for the 
eyres conducted in Yorkshire in July 1268-July 1269, Northumberland in 1269, 
Lincolnshire in 1272, Cambridgeshire in 1272, Norfolk in 1268-1269, and 
Northamptonshire in 1269 reveals no results.261 Further, a search in the reported eyre 
cases under the first half of the reign of Edward I (1272-1307) reveals no such 
evidence in the Bedfordshire eyres of 1276, Hartfordshire eyres of 1278, 
Cumberland eyres of 1278;262 nor in the reports from the Exchequer of the Jews 
                                                           
payment in the Bishop of Worcester’s customs in the Domesday Book and a nine-fold geld 
payable to the king in some cases). 
 257  See SCHLUETER, supra note 199.  
 258  F. M. POWICKE, THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY: 1216–1307, 355, 370 (2d ed. 1962). 
 259  Paul Brand, The Making of English Thirteenth-Century Legislation: Some New 
Evidence, in LAW IN THE CITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY 
CONFERENCE, 2005, at 42 (Andrew Lewis et al., eds., 2007). See generally PAUL BRAND, 
KINGS, BARONS AND JUSTICES: THE MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT OF LEGISLATION IN 
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (2003). 
 260  1 EARLIEST ENGLISH LAW REPORTS 1-183 (Paul Brand ed., 1995). 
 261  3 EARLIEST ENGLISH LAW REPORTS 1-40 (Paul Brand ed., 2005). 
 262  Id. at 41-61. 
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between 1272 and 1290; nor other reports from pre-1290.263 David Seipp’s index of 
the Year Books, to both printed and manuscript versions, also returned no results.264  
Printed select cases from the ecclesiastical courts during the reign of Edward 
(admittedly including only a few cases up to 1275) contain prohibition cases from 
1274 and 1275, the former in which the plaintiff is adjudged to “wage his law 
twelve-handed,” but it makes no mention of multiple damages.265 Other 
ecclesiastical cases date from 1279 and are too late for the purposes of this 
analysis.266 A large collection of cases extracted from the plea rolls of the 1220s and 
1230s appear in Bracton’s Note Book, on which G. B. Flahiff has undertaken 
extensive research.267 Yet a word search of multiple damages cognates (“dupl-”, 
“tripl-”, and “quad-”) failed to find a match, again disclosing no use of the terms 
duplum, triplum, or quadruplum in those cases selected by Maitland as worthy of 
editing. 
The Patent Rolls (or Rotuli litterarum patentium) are a series of administrative 
records compiled in the English Chancery, running from 1201 to the present day.268 
They show no evidence of a discourse linking multiple damages and replevin for the 
relevant period from 1201-1278. On January 20, 1263, the Rolls note that, in respect 
of a notification that the king was “perturbed about the injuries, damages and 
violences lately committed against the church and ecclesiastical persons in the 
province of Canterbury,” and it recorded that those found responsible “shall make 
                                                           
 263  4 EARLIEST ENGLISH LAW REPORTS 462-590 (Paul Brand ed., 2006). 
 264  David J. Seipp, Medieval English Legal History: An Index and Paraphrase of Printed 
Year Book Reports, 1268 – 1535, in LEGAL HISTORY: THE YEAR BOOKS, B.U. SCH. OF L. (Sept. 
30, 2014, 2:07 PM), http://www.bu.edu/law/seipp/ (finding the search terms “dupl,” “tripl,” 
“quadr,” and “multipl” provided no hits that were dated before 1300). 
 265  SELECT ECCLESIASTICAL CASES FROM THE KING’S COURTS 1272-1307 1 (David Millon 
ed., 2009); see also David Millon, Introduction, in SELECT ECCLESIASTICAL CASES xiv-cxxviii 
(2009) (showing Selden Society volume and other publications are based on his unpublished 
PhD dissertation, D. Millon, Canon Law and Common Law During the Reign of Edward I 
(1982)). 
 266  SELECT ECCLESIASTICAL CASES, supra note 265, at 72-82 (discussing cases from 
Norfolk eyre of 1286). 
 267  See generally 1 HENRY DE BRAXTON, BRACTON’S NOTE BOOK: A COLLECTION OF CASES 
DECIDED IN THE KING'S COURTS DURING THE REIGN OF HENRY THE THIRD (F. W. Maitland ed., 
1999); G. B. Flahiff, The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth Century (pt. 
1), 6 MEDIEVAL STUD. 261 (1944); G. B. Flahiff, The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in 
the Thirteenth Century (pt. 2), 7 MEDIAEVAL STUD. 229 (1945). 
 268  I have consulted the Rolls for the following periods: ROTULI LITTERARUM PATENTIUM IN 
TURRI LONDINENSI ASSERVATI (Thomas D. Hardy ed., 1835) (reviewing the Rolls for the 
periods 1201-1216); CALENDAR OF THE PATENT ROLLS PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC RECORD 
OFFICE [HENRY III AD 1216-1272] (1901-1913) [hereinafter LETTERS PATENT OF THE REIGN OF 
HENRY III] (reviewing the Rolls for the periods 1216-1232); 1 CALENDAR OF THE PATENT 
ROLLS PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE. [EDWARD I AD 1272-1307] (1893-1901) 
[hereinafter CALENDARS OF PATENT ROLLS] (reviewing the Rolls for the periods 1232-1278). I 
used G. R. Boynton, Calendar of Patent Rolls Search, U. IOWA LIBR. (Oct. 1, 2014, 10:03 
AM), http://sdrc.lib.uiowa.edu/patentrolls, to search the texts and calendars after 1216 and up 
to 1452.  
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competent amends before next Sunday, upon which Letare Jerusalem is sung.”269 
There is no evidence of multiple damages here as there was to be in the 1278 statute 
in clause 1 for forcible entry into religious houses. On June 25, 1256, the Rolls 
record that “[f]or any trespass in the forest he shall not be amerced above the same 
sum, on condition that he pay the damages according to a just valuation.”270 Again, 
there is no mention of multiple damages here. The rolls of parliament, the official 
records of the meetings of the English parliament from the reign of Edward I (1272-
1307) until the reign of Henry VII (1485-1509), do not discuss multiple damages 
either.271 The tentative conclusion from these absences is that there is no obvious 
evidence of widespread customary use of multiple damages in relation to replevin 
and its related action of gavelet.272  
H. The Emerging Crime-Tort Distinction Between the Anglo-Saxon Period and the 
Late Thirteenth Century  
A common and oft-cited point of origin to punitive damages is the phenomenon 
of compensation tariffs in Anglo-Saxon England. This discourse is difficult to 
separate from the discussions above relating to multiple damages and damages in 
respect of iniuria, as well as the seminal debate as to when the English common law 
recognized a distinction between tort and crime. Some scholars assert an unbroken 
line of development between modern punitive damages and the money compositions 
in pre-conquest England.273 An understanding of monetary compensation and 
feuding in pre- and post-Conquest England has undergone considerable revision in 
recent scholarship, however. 
It was a commonplace of nineteenth-century legal history that monetary 
compensation overtook a feuding and vengeance culture, and that such a 
development set justice on its way towards its fulfilment in centralized regnal 
authority, public peace, and state-mandated punishment based on a moral liability 
received through Christian penitential tradition.274 Against this linear notion of 
evolution, recent histories emphasize instead the simultaneity of feud/revenge, 
compensation, and punishment-based legal enforcement systems.275 Attention 
                                                           
 269  5 LETTERS PATENT OF THE REIGN OF HENRY III, supra note 268, at 378. 
 270  4 LETTERS PATENT OF THE REIGN OF HENRY III, supra note 268, at 484. 
 271  Using Boynton, supra note 268, I was unable to find the term “damages” in either 1-6 
LETTERS PATENT OF THE REIGN OF HENRY III, supra note 268 or 1-2 CALENDARS OF PATENT 
ROLLS, supra note 268. 
 272  I make no claim to undertaking a definitive search of all relevant sources, which is 
beyond the scope of this Article. Additional research needs to be conducted on the unprinted 
manuscript materials to investigate this more comprehensively. 
 273  See e.g., Wise v. Teerpenning, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 112, 119 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) (stating 
the provisions as to damages in a 1837 wrongful death statute had such similarity “with the 
[Anglo-Saxon] past . . . as to induce the belief that it [the Anglo-Saxon customs in seventh-
century Britain requiring money compositions for wrongdoing] was in the view of our 
legislature”). 
 274  Valerie Allen, When Compensation Costs an Arm and a Leg, in CAPITAL AND 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 17 (Jay Paul Gates & Nicole Marafioti 
eds., 2014).  
 275  Id. 
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focuses on the gradual change from a system of feud in the seventh century, being 
the earliest date for recorded Anglo-Saxon law, to one of punishment, a change well 
underway by the eleventh century. 
Tracing change in the historical phenomena of feud/revenge, compensation, and 
punishment also has a crucial impact on accounts of when the common law first 
began to conceive of a conceptual differentiation between tort and crime. It is 
equally significant for the history of punitive damages. One aspect of this problem is 
to identify when the common law moved from penalizing wrongdoing by way of 
“money compositions” under the Anglo-Saxon kings, to one that provided for 
individual compensation and penalties. The former is regarded as a communal or 
private system characterized by tariffs and indicative of a system that does not 
differentiate between torts and crime. The latter is “public” in the sense of being 
administered by a centralized governing authority that distinguishes capital 
punishment and fines—that is “crimes” on the one hand and compensation for loss 
or “torts” on the other.  
Another aspect of this issue, is at what time English law recognized crime as 
distinct from lesser wrongdoing that also involved personal injury, namely what we 
now call “torts.” The answer, is that compensation and punishment co-existed from 
the Anglo-Saxon period, and the distinction only became apparent by the last quarter 
of the thirteenth century. 
1. Anglo-Saxon Money Compositions as a Precursor to Crime and Tort Laws 
Anglo-Saxon customs and written laws reveal an approach to law that contained 
a system of monetary compensation capable of redeeming what is nowadays called 
crimes, including homicide and torts. The Anglo-Saxon laws evidence a “feud” 
system, which contained both the personal self-help remedy of vengeance by force 
of arms, and a system in which compensation tariffs were payable for commission of 
wrongs. The customary laws regarding private vengeance contained the concept of 
blood feud, which was based on family honor and tribal loyalty. 
 Although Guy Halsall insists that the term “feud” ought not apply in the context 
of the Middle Ages because feud applies to reciprocal violence only without the 
alternative of compensation, other scholars have taken a broader approach to the 
term.276 What was present in the medieval period is what many other scholars have 
termed feud, and what Halsall hoped to rename “customary vengeance,” describing 
situations in which compensation serves as an alternative to violence, with the threat 
of vengeance serving as motivating force for the payment of such compensation in a 
composition settlement.277  
                                                           
 276  Guy Halsall, Violence and Society in the Early Medieval West: An Introductory Survey, 
in VIOLENCE AND SOCIETY IN THE EARLY MEDIEVAL WEST 1, 19-20 (Guy Halsall ed., 1998); cf. 
Paul R. Hyams, Was There Really Such a Thing as Feud in the High Middle Ages?, in 
VENGEANCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 151 (Susanna A. Throop & Paul R. Hyams eds., 2010) 
[hereinafter Hyams, Vengeance in the Middle Ages] (modifying his earlier work PAUL R. 
HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 33 (Barbara H. Rosenwein ed., 
2003) [hereinafter HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION])); see also John G. H. Hudson, 
Faide, Vengeance, Et Violence En Angleterre (ca 900-1200), in LA VENGEANCE 400-1200 341 
(Dominique Barthélemy et al. eds., 2006). 
 277  Halsall, supra note 276, at 22. 
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This concept of “customary vengeance,” Halsall posits, is fairly close to what 
was meant by early medieval Germanic terms such as faithu, faida, and the Anglo-
Saxon term fæhðe.278 Although Halsall’s narrow use of the term is valuable in 
drawing attention to the distinction between the role of feud as violence and the 
system of monetary compositions as means of resolving disputes and wrongdoing, 
many scholars continue to use “feud” in this early medieval context, albeit by 
explicitly defining what they understand by that term.279 This section of the Article 
provides an account of recent histories that have challenged existing understandings 
of Anglo-Saxon money compositions. 
Recent histories stress that compensation and punishment co-existed with 
vengeance and violence in Anglo-Saxon codes. First, it is necessary to understand 
the Anglo-Saxon system. The three kinds of payments referred to in this Anglo-
Saxon context are the bot, the wergeld, and the wite. Compensation payable to the 
victim for a non-lethal personal injury was the bot.280 Compensation paid to the 
victim’s kin in reparation for “emendable” homicide was his wergeld, payable 
according to the status of the man slain.281 An amount payable as a fine to the king 
or to a local nobleman for breach of his peace was the wite.282 
The earliest known law code in England, composed in the seventh century under 
King Aethelbert of Kent (c. 602/3), provided for monetary payments. These were in 
the form of a list of offenses for which compensation was payable to the victim by 
particular sums of money, calculated according to the social status of the offender 
and victim.283 There are numerous examples of multiple damages payments for 
certain wrongdoing, or what Daniella Fruscione terms “embryonic” examples of 
punitive damages.284 For example, Chapter 9 states that “[i]f the king is drinking at a 
                                                           
 278  Id. at 28. 
 279  HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 6-11, 32-33. “[F]eud is one 
of the main ways in which cultures formalize the working of vengeance, embody it within 
some patterned format, presumably in order to minimize the risks of dissolution into 
uncontrolled violence and chaos.” Paul R. Hyams, Afterword: Neither Unnatural nor Wholly 
Negative: The Future of Medieval Vengeance, in VENGEANCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 203, 206 
(Susanna A. Throop & Paul R. Hyams eds., 2010) [hereinafter Hyams, Neither Unnatural nor 
Wholly Negative]. 
 280  HUDSON, supra note 162, at 198-99. For bot as compensation paid to the victim, see 
Stanley Rubin, Bot Compensation in Anglo-Saxon Law: A Reassessment, 17 J. LEGAL HIST. 
144, 148 (1996). Not to be confused with bot, the manbot was compensation payable to a slain 
man’s lord, in addition to the wergeld. HUDSON, supra note 162, at 179. Although this Old 
English word originally meant “compensation,” it came to mean payments to God, the 
Church, men in general, or the king, from Alfred’s time (c. 890) onwards. In Alfred’s time it 
referred to payments to secular lords rather than the victim or kin. Id. at 198-99. 
 281  HUDSON, supra note 162, at 179. Some forms of killing, linked to betrayal of one’s lord 
or concealment, were “unamendable,” that is, not able to be satisfied by payment of the 
wergeld. Id. at 166. 
 282  Id. at 188-91. 
 283  LISI OLIVER, THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH LAW 59-81 (2002). 
 284  Id. at 59-63; see also FELIX LIEBERMANN, DIE GESETZE DER ANGELSACHSEN (reprt. 
1960) (1903-1916); Daniela Fruscione, Beginnings and Legitimation of Punishment in Early 
Anglo-Saxon Legislation from the Seventh to the Ninth Century, in CAPITAL AND CORPORAL 
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man’s home, and anyone commits any evil deed there, he is to pay twofold 
compensation.”285  
The code has no explicit traces of corporal punishment, but in some of the 
circumstances for which such compensation is awarded, there is a tacit suggestion of 
punishment by payment. One example is the large payment for taking off someone’s 
thumbnail.286 This procedure was administered “horizontally,” meaning that the 
wrongdoer’s kin was responsible for the restitution if the wrongdoer fled or 
escaped.287 In addition, the penal nature of some payments was evident: in cases of 
theft, a wite or fine was payable to the king and in cases of murder a drihtinbeag, 
containing both punishment and compensation, was payable to the king (containing 
both punitive and restitutive elements).288  
The influence of Christianity is evident in the codes of Wihtred of Kent, some 
nine years after those of Aethelbert’s laws. In place of compensatory restitution were 
fines, as well as corporal and capital punishments, exacted by the king, representing 
the first instance of the application of punishment as a top-down phenomenon.289 
Three hundred years later, a code composed, under the West Saxon King, Alfred, 
witnesses “a real strategy to legitimize punishment. This starts with his long 
prologue, which contains the Ten Commandments and other precepts from Mosaic 
Law. Death penalties abound, imposed for murder, copulation with cattle, sacrifices 
to false gods, and even for failing to enclose a dangerous ox.”290 Yet, the bot and 
wergeld were also payable in the alternative.291  
There are three uneasy and co-existent dynamics at play in these compensation 
systems: vengeance, compensation, and punishment. Punishment and compensation 
co-existed.292 The place of monetary compensation within this narrative is an uneasy 
one, because it represents either, “limp substitute for revenge or ideologically-
inflected ‘progress’ towards centralized law.”293 But, for Fruscione, money in the 
form of compensation tariffs, including the fine or wite payable for breaking the 
king’s peace, are crucial to both revenge and punishment: that is, a third party 
mediates and controls the exchange between the opposing parties by this means.294 
The self-help justice of revenge was subject to the authority of “public approval of 
fair play,” while compensation tariffs were exacted by regnal authority.295 
                                                           
PUNISHMENT IN ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 34, 35-37 (Jay Paul Gates & Nicole Marafioti eds., 
2014).  
 285  OLIVER, supra note 283, at 62-63. 
 286  Id. at 72-73. 
 287  Id. at 66-67. 
 288  Id. at 64-65. 
 289  Fruscione, supra note 284, at 38-39. 
 290  Id. at 41. 
 291  Id.  
 292  Id. at 34-35. 
 293  Allen, supra note 274, at 18. 
 294  Fruscione, supra note 284, at 36. 
 295  Allen, supra note 274, at 19. 
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Valerie Allen characterizes vengeance and punishment as two vectors of force: 
vengeance tracking a horizontal line of reciprocal violence between (roughly) equal 
bodies (whether kin or entire communities), while punishment thrusts vertically and 
uni-directionally down from top (“state,” ecclesiastical, or regnal power) to bottom 
with a mandate of authority that preempts, at least in theory, reprisal from family and 
friends of the disciplined offender.296 The punishment that ensued, in the corporal 
punishment provisions in the later Anglo-Saxon codes, was a “Christianized 
violence” that prefigured the twelfth-century “spiritual economics” of purgatory that 
enabled pre-payment of a sinner’s debt to God and moved social order from a 
compensatory to a “disciplinary” mindset in a process that involved a “theologizing” 
of the law.297 It is a moot point whether the revenge/punishment distinction is a valid 
one. The line between “handing over body parts in payment” (feud-revenge) and 
having them taken in punishment  is a fine one.298 For example, King Edgar’s law of 
talion provides for mutilations that both deter other possible offenders and save the 
soul of the offender by provoking suffering without death.299 
Controversy remains as to whether these compensation tariffs were adjustable or 
not. Stanley Rubin argues not, claiming that where personal injury occurred, the bot 
or compensation was fixed regardless of rank, while this criterion determined the 
amount of one’s wergeld, in the case of death.300 Rubin, commenting on the two 
most important English codes because of their comprehensiveness and coverage—
those of Aethelbert of Kent and Alfred of Wessex—notes that the compensation 
amounts were fixed relative to the wergeld of an ordinary freeman.301 In contrast, 
Lisi Oliver infers from the incompleteness of circumstantial detail that the written 
tariffs constituted the maximum penalty and were therefore adjustable.302 Oliver’s 
arguments in support of a degree of latitude in the application of the amounts, 
according to Allen, seems to better support the contemporary historical conditions 
when coinage was scarce, payment in kind was common, and the lack of 
precedential binding value of these customs.303 This suggestion, that the 
compensation payments were variable and adjustable, further reduces their definite 
demarcation from more modern concepts of proportionate compensation. 
As T. F. T. Plucknett has shown conclusively, an important purpose of Anglo-
Saxon legal proceedings was to secure pecuniary compensation, and it was not a 
                                                           
 296  Id. at 17. Allen cites a recent study by Hyams, although it is quite different from 
Allen’s formulation. See Hyams, Neither Unnatural nor Wholly Negative, supra note 279, at 
217-18. 
 297  Caroline Walker Bynum, The Power in the Blood: Sacrifice, Satisfaction and 
Substitution in Late Medieval Soteriology, in THE REDEMPTION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY 
SYMPOSIUM ON CHRIST AS REDEEMER 177, 192, 198 (Stephen T. David et al. eds., 2004). 
 298  WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 35 (2006). 
 299  Allen, supra note 274, at 18. 
 300  Rubin, supra note 280, at 146-51 (noting some exceptions for clergy and for genital 
damage). 
 301  Rubin, supra note 280, at 148. 
 302  LISI OLIVER, THE BODY LEGAL IN BARBARIAN LAW 50-51 (2011). 
 303  Allen, supra note 274, at 20. 
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large step from the bot to the damages of later law.304 Whether these Anglo-Saxon 
compensation tariffs of the eleventh century had influence beyond that century, 
particularly on the doctrine of multiple damages in the thirteenth-century statutes and 
law, is an issue that, to date has no clear answer. It was Maitland’s view that pre-
conquest tariffs did not extend beyond the twelfth century.305 The late Patrick 
Wormald was a staunch and articulate proponent of an opposing view.306 Wormald 
has few adherents to his line of argument, although many scholars judge that 
Maitland located the change too early.307 Yet evidence points to the persistence of 
this Anglo-Saxon system of compensation into at least the early decades of the 
twelfth century. As John Hudson puts it, in summary of this pre-Conquest system, 
“[c]ompensation and punishment co-existed, the balance between them a matter of 
considerable significance.”308 For example, the Leges Willelmi, or Leis Willelme, 
from the early twelfth century, contains both provisions for compensation for the 
head of an opponent who could not be produced in court and for the wergeld 
payment.309  
The concept of vengeance also persisted into the twelfth century, as the Leges 
Henrici Primi attests.310 Moreover, this law code demonstrates that wrongs were 
identified as having two elements: first, the damage or loss inflicted, and second, the 
affront to honor, and related injured feelings, that the deed entailed.311 Interference 
with the free enjoyment of landholding related to interference with the free, quiet, 
and honorable holding of that land, implicitly amounting to an affront to honor, or 
iniuriae.312 In both pleading formularies and local court records from the thirteenth 
century, money is frequently demanded not only for economic loss but also for 
                                                           
 304  T. F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 370 (5th ed., 1956). 
 305  See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 523-24. 
 306  But Patrick Wormald argues that Maitland was “wrong” to say that late Anglo-Saxon 
law retained a “scheme of wer and bloodfeud, of bot and wite (blood-price . . . amendment 
and fine).” Compare 1 PATRICK WORMALD, THE MAKING OF ENGLISH LAW: KING ALFRED TO 
THE TWELFTH CENTURY: LEGISLATION AND ITS LIMITS 17 (1999), with POLLOCK  & MAITLAND, 
supra note 160, at 448. 
 307  Naomi Hurnard, in her study of medieval homicide, observes that the end of the 
wergeld system occurred in the later years of King Henry I’s reign. NAOMI D. HURNARD, 
KING’S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE AD 1307 9 (1969). 
 308  HUDSON, supra note 162, at 178. 
 309  HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 147-48; LIEBERMANN, supra 
note 284, at 492-520 (referring to Leges Willelmi or Leis Willelme or “Leges Wmi”); see also 
Early English Laws: Texts, UNIV. OF LONDON 
http://www.earlyenglishlaws.ac.uk/laws/texts/leis-wl1 (last visited Feb. 3, 2016). 
 310  David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 
B.U. L. REV. 59, 64 n.28 (1996) (citing LEGES HENRICI PRIMI 261 (L.J. Downer ed. & trans., 
1972)). Hudson also notes that the Leges Henrici Primi still required compensation by way of 
wergeld and wite for homicide, as well as circumstances requiring physical punishment. See 
HUDSON, supra note 162, at 409-410. 
 311  LIEBERMANN, supra note 284, at 282-83 (citing Beckerman, supra note 115, at 165-66). 
 312  Beckerman, supra note 115, at 169. 
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shame, dishonor, insult or outrage, or disparagement.313 The Leges Edwardi shows 
“limited interest” in wergelds and their payment, but hints of payment for homicide 
remain.314  
2. The Distinction Between Crime and Tort 
When did the English common law recognize a distinction between crime and 
tort? This Article will not attempt to provide a definitive response to this 
imponderable, but will instead lay out the nuanced considerations that scholars have 
marked for attention. For example, according to Paul Hyams, both the action of 
trespass and the appeal of felony developed by the later thirteenth century at the 
latest.315 Instead of attempting to place a specific date on this change, Hyams instead 
traces historical developments from around 1100, when a “single undifferentiated 
action for all serious private secular wrongs” existed, in which there was no clear 
discernible difference, as we would understand it between torts and crimes.316 This 
undifferentiated action appears in the anonymous Leges Henrici Primi (c.1100). The 
other chronological endpoint is the time by which the felonious appeal, or “appeal,” 
existed, which represented a clear distinction between crime and tort in the late 
thirteenth century.317 Hyams points to five “necessary conditions” for the separation 
of trespass and appeal, that led to the differentiation of crime from tort.318 It is worth 
setting out this gradual process in some detail, and in light of other recent 
scholarship.319 
First was the need for a doctrinal distinction between law and fact, illustrated by 
the maxim from Digest 3.2.11.4 that “ignorance of the law is not excusable, but 
ignorance of the fact is.”320 The distinction between law and fact is also indicated in 
the widespread use of the jury in royal courts in real property actions. These royal-
court juries gave real-property verdicts based on factual issues, not legal ones. This 
                                                           
 313  Id. at 173-76. In the French law of the formularies the usual term is huntage (mod. Fr. 
honté).  
 314  HUDSON, supra note 162, at 410 (citing Leges Edwardi Confessoris, EARLY ENG. LAWS 
18, 12.6, http://www.earlyenglishlaws.ac.uk/laws/texts/ecf1 (last visited Jan. 18, 2016)). 
 315  Hyams, VENGEANCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES, supra note 276, at 159-60. 
 316  Id. at 157. 
 317  HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 151 (citing Beckerman, 
supra note 115, at 161-81). Müller concurs that the appeal of felony in thirteenth-century 
England contained the requisite elements of a crime: namely, royal jurisdiction by means of 
the crown pleas of felonious offences (placita coronae feloniae) and which were handled by 
the king’s officials. This warranted the maximum penalty of execution by around 1200 (for 
robbery, rape, and manslaughter) and decision-making of guilt by lay juries, not ordeal. 
Overall, these appeals connoted crimen as “mandatory prosecution and sentencing.” 
WOLFGANG P. MÜLLER, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ABORTION IN THE WEST: ITS ORIGINS IN 
MEDIEVAL LAW 67 (2012). 
 318  HYAMS RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 216-41. 
 319  Id. at 231. 
 320  DIG. 3.2.11.4 (Ulpianus, On the Edict 6). 
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development occurred by the mid-twelfth century as a result of the inheritance of 
Roman law learning into the schools of England and Western Europe.321  
The second requirement was the recognition of the further doctrinal 
differentiation between crime and tort.322 This distinction first emerged around 1166, 
from the reception of Justinianic Roman law in Western Europe and then England, 
and was recognized in an inchoate way by the Glanvill treatise (c. 1187-1189), 
which divided pleas between civil and criminal.323 The Glanvill treatise, however, 
when discussing the criminal pleas, included virtually all wrongs within it, including 
the plea of the king’s peace.324 Further, as T. F. T. Plucknett has observed, Glanvill’s 
distinction bore little relation to the state of law in his time.325 But it was Bracton’s 
treatise composed in the mid-1220s that ensured the triumph of this distinction, 
defining crime as a breach of the peace, implying its public nature.326 Major crimes 
(often termed crimina capitalia) carried punishment to “life and members” (i.e., 
capital punishment) while minor crimes, such as trespass and replevin, carried 
pecuniary consequences only.327  
This distinction drawn by Bracton did not settle the matter. By the late thirteenth 
century the authors of Fleta and Britton, both writing around 1290, took opposite 
lines—one adopting Bracton; the other not.328 This contrasts with the earlier 
distinction between crime and delict or tort that jurists in canon law and Justinianic 
Roman law had drawn between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries.329 The jurists of 
the “learned laws” articulated to a high level of abstraction by the mid-thirteenth 
                                                           
 321  Hyams, VENGEANCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES, supra note 276, at 157, 162; see also 
HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276 at 3-33 (indicating that a date around 
1166 when Justinianic Roman law learning reached England, thus modifying his earlier.). 
 322  Hyams, Vengeance in the Middle Ages, supra note 276, at 220. 
 323  “Placitorum aliud criminale aliud civile.” GLANVILL, supra note 162, at i.1, 3. 
 324  Id. at i.1-4, 3-5; see also the editor’s introduction, G.D.G. Hall, Introduction to 
GLANVILL, supra note 162, at i, xx, (setting out a table listing “civil” and “criminal” pleas); 
Charles Donahue, Jr., The Emergence of the Crime-Tort Distinction in England, in CONFLICT 
IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 219-28 (Warren Brown & Piotr Górecki eds., 2003); Charles Donahue, 
Jr., Relationships Among Roman Law, Common Law, and Modern Civil Law: Ius Commune, 
Canon Law, and Common Law in England, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1745, 1751 (1992). 
 325  PLUCKNETT, supra note 304, at 422. 
 326  “In primis de pace domini regis et iustitia eius violate per murdritores et robbatores et 
burgatores.” BRACTON, supra note 162, at 327 n.115. 
 327  Id. at 334 n.118 (translating “De crimine laesae maiestatis”); id. at 340 n.120 
(translating “De crimine homicidii et qualiter dividitur”); id. at 359 n.127; see also Hyams, 
Vengeance in the Middle Ages, supra note 276, at 159. 
 328  “[B]ecause the lives and members of men, whether to protect or to condemn when they 
do wrong, are in the power of kings and not of others . . . . There is also a certain penalty 
which is called pecuniary and which . . . is regarded as less than the least corporal 
punishment.” 2 FLETA, 34-35 (H.G. Richardson & G.O. Sayles eds., trans., 1955). FLETA 
follows Bracton, while BRITTON does not.  
 329  Anne Lefebvre-Teillard, Crime ou délit? Le droit romano -canonique à la recherche 
d’un critière distinctif, in DER EINFLUSS DER KANONISTIK AUF DIE EUROPÄISCHE 
RECHTSKULTUR 37 (Orazio Condorelli et al. eds., 2012). 
46https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss2/8
2016] THE ROOTS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AT COMMON LAW 297 
 
century differences between the two terms, based on the intention of the act, the 
seriousness of the consequences, and the penalty imposed on the wrongdoing. 
The third criterion was the expansion of the king’s peace into a national 
protection for all the king’s subjects and all inhabitants of the realm.330 In this 
context, peace meant “protection” or “law.” One means was by royal grants of 
protection by charter; thus converting wrongs done to grantees, such as religious 
houses, into injuries actionable as if done to the king himself.331 Another means was 
by the proliferation of specific grants of peace.332  A third means was by the 
development of the pleading of special contempts (“tickets”) that brought new 
business into the royal courts.  
These special contempts were part of the first wave of trespass writs in quare 
form, which did not mention peace at all. The crux was that men and women could 
seek remedies from the king for wrongs committed against them, as wrongs in 
breach of “the lord king’s peace.”333 Alan Harding has suggested that the 
development of special contempts was the impetus for the birth of the trespass writ, 
with its fundamental focus on breach of the king’s peace.334 Hyams adds that the 
special contempts or “tickets,” which were part of the first wave of trespass writs in 
quare form, do not mention peace at all.335 Therefore, Hyams argues, it was these 
private initiatives, just as much as the royal ones that led to the expansion of the 
king’s peace.336  
The fourth and fifth factors are related, and most appropriately considered 
together. The fourth necessary factor was the rise of the public prosecution of 
“crime,” emerging from the Assizes of Clarendon (1166) and of Northampton 
(1176), which called for juries of presentment at eyre.337 Alongside this, grand juries 
and indictments were established in the last decades of the twelfth century, thus 
publicizing the king’s duty to provide peace for all his subjects.338 This separated 
common law trespass from the appeal of felony.  
But the individual’s sense of his personal injury from an offense against the 
king’s higher authority often brought about an action under the French term 
trespas—consciously excluding the words ‘felony’ to remove it from more formal 
procedures of the criminal appeal, as well as removing the risks to their own bodies 
of that appeal. Richard Fraher marks the beginning of an understanding of criminal 
law as a matter of public law, rather than private law, at canon law in the 1203 
                                                           
 330  HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 224-26. 
 331  Id. at 224. 
 332  Id. at 224-25. 
 333  Id. at 225. 
 334  Id. at 224. 
 335  Id. at 226. 
 336  Id.; cf. Alan Harding, Introduction, in THE ROLL OF THE SHROPSHIRE EYRE OF 1256, 
xlix-li (Alan Harding ed., 1981).  
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decretal of Pope Innocent III that “as a matter of public utility crimes should not 
remain unpunished,” which was employed from the thirteenth century onwards.339  
A fifth factor was common-law felonies, which were offenses in the group 
felonia considered appropriate for indictment by juries under the new assize 
procedure of 1176.340 Hyams opines that the categorization into a term of art of the 
word “trespass” as expressing a vernacular sense of wrong emerged in the plea rolls 
after 1258.341 These were distinct from the appeal of felony (i.e., criminal law) heard 
in royal courts because of the exclusion of words of felony.342  
Although situating the emergence of the distinction between crime and tort in the 
English common law in the thirteenth century, David J. Seipp argues that the 
distinction arose as a consequence of contingency dependent on whether the plaintiff 
chose to pursue his right by way of appeal of felony, indictment of felony, or 
indictment of trespass, which corresponds to modern notions of crime, or by the writ 
of trespass, which corresponds to modern notions of tort.343 The recourse to appeal 
of felony was punishment of a defendant’s “life and members,” i.e., capital 
punishment often by a death sentence, or, more frequently, corporal punishment 
without payment of compensation to the plaintiff.344 The writ of trespass alleging 
force of arms against the king’s peace required a defendant to make payment of 
compensation to the plaintiff.345 In addition, the courts could impose punishment by 
way of fine and imprisonment.346  
Significantly, the appeals of felony or indictments of felony/trespass arose when 
a plaintiff sought vengeance over compensation from a defendant—such notions of 
vengeance replaced bloodfeuds. Royal officers pursued wrongdoers when a plaintiff 
feared or chose not to do so. “This conceptual distinction [between crime and tort],” 
Seipp observes, “is best presented as a choice, therefore, among several options 
available to victims of breaches of the king’s peace.”347 The choice was not 
dependent on the nature of the wrongdoing, since writs of trespass included any kind 
of wrong “from murder to a slap on the face to diverting water onto someone’s 
land,”348 while appeals of felony were available for any of the traditional common 
                                                           
 339  Richard M. Fraher, The Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High 
Middle Ages: “rei publicae interest, ne crimina remaneant impunita,” U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 
578 (1984). 
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172. 
 341  HYAMS, RANCOR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 276, at 333. 
 342  Id. at 231-41. 
 343  Seipp, supra note 310, at 59. 
 344  Id. at 61-62. 
 345  Id. at 61-5. 
 346  Id. at 77. 
 347  Id. at 60. 
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law felonies, including homicide, rape, mayhem (maiming), robbery, burglary, 
larceny, and arson.349  
3. Iniuria as the Primary Influence on the Distinction Between Crime and Tort law 
The preceding account of the crime-tort distinction largely confirms Hyams’s 
account of an inconsistent, irregular, contingent separation of the two. But, important 
as his and other scholars’ narratives are of this phenomenon, the notion of iniuria is 
largely absent. Despite the decline in importance of the Anglo-Saxon compensation 
systems, the notion of vengeance and retribution inherent in the concept of feud that 
was so inextricably linked to such systems of compensation tariffs did not altogether 
disappear. If part of vengeance was tit-for-tat retribution for affront or dishonor, such 
notions subsisted in the awards of damages that emerged following the clearer 
demarcation between the boundaries of tort and crime. How did the English common 
law deal with the concept of insult, hurt feelings, or shame that sometimes 
accompanied personal injury caused by wrongdoing?  
Insult is notably absent from the modern common-law tradition, which awards 
compensation for damage or loss suffered, but ignores affronts to honor entirely. An 
important study by John S. Beckerman observes that other European legal traditions 
that emerged from Roman law made free use of the concept of insult or outrage, and 
influenced English law temporarily between around 1166 until the end of the 
thirteenth century, when records of compensation for wounded honor disappear.350  
Beckerman agrees that the Anglo-Saxon forms of monetary compositions 
continued into the thirteenth century, particularly in local courts, in the sense that 
money is frequently demanded not only for economic loss, but also for shame, 
dishonor, insult or outrage, or disparagement.351 This research of local court records 
confirms the findings of Richardson and Sayles on pleading formularies, which they 
viewed as part of the academic training offered lawyers and estate administrators by 
the Oxford dictatores but which had little influence on pleadings in court.352 The 
simultaneous continuity of the Roman law concept of iniuria is clearly evident here.  
Beckerman makes several observations from these court records from the mid- to 
late-thirteenth century. First, the phrases alleging dishonor appear in lawsuits 
involving a whole variety of wrongs from defamations to forcible injuries to 
breaking obligations to defaulting on transactions. “Any of these offenses could be 
counted a contumely, insult, affront to personal honor. Regardless of the specific 
circumstances of the wrongs, it is evident that the victims felt dishonored or 
disparaged by them.”353  
Second, the specimen counts from the pleading formularies usually distinguish 
separate amounts claimed for damage and shame, although most of the examples in 
the court rolls include an undifferentiated combined sum.354 In only a few cases does 
                                                           
 349  POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 160, at 470; see also Seipp, supra note 310, at 61. 
 350  Beckerman, supra note 115, at 179-181. 
 351  Id. at 173. 
 352  H. G. Richardson & G. O. Sayles, Introduction, in SELECT CASES OF PROCEDURE 
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the amount claimed for dishonor exceed the amount claimed for damage, these 
involving defamation or public insult, in which direct attacks on reputation led to 
obvious disparagement or dishonour as well as economic loss. A plea of trespass 
contained three distinct elements: (1) vim (vi et armis)355 et (2) iniuriam et (3) 
damnum suum.356 Dealing specifically with iniuria, it was the concepts of affront 
that Bracton had in mind when he wrote of the actio iniuriarum to describe the 
English plea of trespass. Here he consciously used the term from Roman law.357 
These pecuniary claims for damage and dishonor in thirteenth-century local court 
records were related to other accusations that mixed civil and criminal elements, 
such as the appeal that sought damages and the trespass count that alleged felony.358 
As the action of trespass flourished in the royal courts, the iniuria, or affront to 
honor, disappeared as an operative element in English tort law, eclipsed totally by 
the element of economic loss. Beckerman notes that this disappearance occurred by 
the end of the thirteenth century when, although trespass pleas could still serve both 
compensatory and penal ends, the means for doing so was by statute, which provided 
not only compensation, but also punitive damages and, on occasion, imprisonment 
for the offender.359 The earlier discussion of the thirteenth-century statutes 
establishes the significance of these enactments in providing for multiple damages, 
although not necessarily at the exclusion of the notion of iniuria.360  
Beckerman reasons that the disappearance of the notion of iniuria was because of 
the changing nature of the writs of trespass by the end of the thirteenth century.361 As 
documented by Plucknett and Milsom, writs of trespass early in that century almost 
exclusively concerned what Glanvill had termed “civil” matters, which concerned 
land or feudal matters.362 That is, these trespass writs, on the one hand, did not deal 
with “criminal” matters that gave rise to felonious appeals, nor, on the other hand, 
did they deal with the less serious wrongdoing that we may associate with modern 
day torts, such as battery and assault.363  
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By the end of the thirteenth century, the forms of words contra pacem and vi et 
armis in these civil writs took on such artifice that nearly all non-felonious 
trespasses came within their remit, and the king’s courts took on all of these matters. 
In principle, such acts were in breach of the king’s “peace;” and what made it a 
breach of the king’s peace was “the person, the place, even the season;” and so the 
concern here was with dishonor to the king—not the personal honor of the king’s 
subjects.364 On the criminal side, as the writ de odio et atia taught so clearly, royal 
justice was not supposed to be used for purposes of private retribution.365 On the 
civil side, the king’s courts provided no remedy by which subjects could vindicate 
personal honor, leaving the law of defamation to remain undeveloped in the common 
law in the fourteenth century, as a subject left to the lesser tribunals, local secular 
courts, and the ecclesiastical courts.366 Thus, Beckerman argues, it was precisely 
because royal jurisdiction was founded upon the idea of affront to the king’s honour 
that, for everyone else, honor and shame ceased to be legally meaningful 
categories.367  
III. CONCLUSION: INIURIA AS THE COMMON THREAD 
The extensive meta-narrative presented in this Article suggests that Beckerman 
may have been somewhat preemptive in signaling the end of the conceptual 
influence of iniuria by the close of the thirteenth century as a pre-modern analogue 
to the exemplary, retributory, or punitive element that calls for punitive or exemplary 
damages in tort. The provisions in the Statute of Westminster I that call for multiple 
damages seem to indicate the continuity of notions of iniuria well into the late 
1200s. Indeed, the longevity of these provisions in subsequent case law and 
legislation, and the appearance of multiple damages provisions in later statutes, 
further suggest the ongoing influence of the concept of iniuria and its cognates. This 
suggestion, of course, depends on the hypothesis that multiple damages in the 
statutes sprang from Roman law, and more particularly from Roman law notions of 
iniuria. 
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John’s reign (1166-1216). Id.; HURNARD, supra note 307, at app. I; see also Susanne Jenks, 
The Writ and the Exception de odio et atia, 23 J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2002) (explaining the 
differences between the writ de odio et atia and the exception de odio et atia).   
 367 Beckerman, supra note 115, at 180-81. 
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 Law is ever backward looking. Lord Chief Justice Pratt, when deciding 
cases in the latter 1700s in a context when his own judicial power to determine 
damages swung, to some extent back, from the jury to the bench, revealing a search 
for doctrine by taking a long glance back to the statutes and cases of the late Middle 
Ages. Sayer’s near-contemporaneous textbook on damages reveals a similar 
inclination. The thirteenth century played a longstanding and pivotal role in the 
future development of the common law in England. Paul Brand has commented on 
this century, particularly on the statutes produced under Edward I, in just such a 
way:  
During the later Middle Ages knowledge of the major Edwardian statutes 
was an essential prerequisite for any practising lawyer. It seems probable 
that many of them possessed a book of the ‘old’ statutes, a large part of 
which contained the legislation of Edward’s reign. In the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries lectures on the legislation of Edward’s reign formed a 
core element in the educational curriculum of the Inns of Court. As late as 
the early seventeenth century, Edward Coke’s Second Institutes, dealing 
with the older legislation which a law student would have to master, was 
concerned mainly with legislation of this reign. In his introduction to the 
Second Institutes, Coke became the first to describe Edward I as ‘our 
Justinian.’368 
The extent, nature, and duration of the influence of the “learned laws” on the 
common law of England is a matter that scholars will continue to debate for 
generations to come. This Article charts a tentative, but suggestive, pathway that the 
sources dictate and invites others to pursue the leads I have outlined, and make up 
their own minds.  
 
                                                           
 368 Paul A. Brand, Legal Change in the Later Thirteenth Century: Statutory and Judicial 
Remodelling of the Action of Replevin, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43, 43 n.1 (1987). The Second 
Institutes were published posthumously in 1642. Allen D. Boyer, Coke, Sir Edward (1552–
1634), OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NAT’L. BIOGRAPHY, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4055 (last visited Feb. 3, 2016). 
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